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A R T I C L E S
Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, 
But How Dead, and What Replaces It?
Joel B. Eisen*
federal and state regulators as operating within separate and 
distinct spheres of authority,7 recognizing instead that state 
and federal initiatives frequently overlap. The Court has 
provided guidance to govern the interaction between FERC 
and the states going forward, but has also left considerable 
uncertainty. The impacts of these decisions will reverberate 
for years to come.
This transformative change in electricity law reflects the 
tectonic shift occurring today in the electric grid. For over six 
decades after the FPA’s enactment in 1935, the nation’s system 
of making electricity and delivering it to customers was stable 
and predictable.8 The nation’s major utilities were vertically 
integrated monopolies, much as the phone system once was. 
Utilities generated electricity in their power plants, moved it 
across their transmission wires, and delivered it to their cus-
tomers.9 State public utility commissions regulated utilities’ 
rates and services to guard against the ills of monopolization.10
Now, there is change everywhere. Solar and wind power 
is being rapidly added to the grid.11 This power is generated 
at the edge of the grid in places like residential rooftops 
and remote wind farms, rather than in central power sta-
tions. It requires new transmission lines, grid connections 
Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 139 (2001).
7. Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 14 (noting that, after FERC v. EPSA, 
“there is no bright line preventing state utility commissions and the FERC 
from working in concert to advance a more efficient electricity system.”); Jim 
Rossi & Jon Wellinghoff, FERC v. EPSA and Adjacent State Regulation of Cus-
tomer Energy Resources, 40 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. F. 23, 24 (2016) (“Rather 
than fixate on this divide, the EPSA majority approached FERC’s jurisdiction 
in a functional manner, endorsing pragmatism over formalism in the regula-
tion of energy markets.”). For discussions of the jurisdictional “bright line,” see 
generally Robert R. Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and 
State Regulation of Today’s Electric Grid, 36 Energy L.J. 203 (2015), and Rossi, 
supra note 6.
8. Nordhaus, supra note 7, at 207; Rossi, supra note 6, at *4.
9. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002) (“When the FPA became law, most 
electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities that had constructed their 
own power plants, transmission lines, and local delivery systems.”).
10. Rossi, supra note 6, at **33–34.
11. Solar, Natural Gas, Wind Make Up Most 2016 Generation Additions, U.S. En-
ergy Info. Admin. (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
cfm?id=25172 (showing that solar and wind make up more that two-thirds 
of scheduled capacity additions for 2016, and that “2016 will be the first year 
in which utility-scale solar additions exceed additions from any other single 
energy source”); see also David Roberts, There’s a Lot More Solar Power in the 
US Than We Thought, Vox: Energy & Env’t (July 2, 2015), http://www.vox.
com/2015/7/2/8880311/solar-power-underestimated (claiming that EIA data 
may underestimate solar capacity by as much as one-third due to undercount-
ing of small-scale rooftop solar PV systems).
* Joel B. Eisen is a Professor of Law and Austin Owen Research Fellow 
at The University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks 
Emily Hammond, Felix Mormann, and Shelley Welton for their 
insights, as well as the George Washington University Law School for 
its kind invitation to participate in the 2016 J.B. and Maurice C. 
Shapiro Environmental Law Symposium, “The Electricity Mix of the 
Future: Environment, Economics, and Governance,” at which the 
author presented on this topic.
In a remarkable burst of activity, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases in the past year involving the split of jurisdiction between the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) and the states in the energy sector. 
FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n1 and Hughes v. Talen 
Energy Marketing2 dealt with the relationship between FERC 
and the states in governing the electric grid under the Federal 
Power Act (“FPA”). ONEOK v. Learjet3 involved regulation 
of natural gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”), 
which also serves as precedent for decisions involving the 
electric grid.4
These watershed decisions5 herald a new approach to gov-
erning the rapid evolution of the modern electric grid, but its 
precise contours will not be known for some time. They mark 
the end of “dual federalism” in electricity law6 that treated 
1. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
2. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
3. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).
4. The NGA and FPA are read in pari materia. Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State 
Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 506 (1989) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717c-
d); Ky. Util. Co. v. FERC, 760 F.2d 1321, 1325 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Section 
1(b) of the NGA, like section 206 of the FPA, gives FERC authority over 
“practices . . . affecting rates.” Compare 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a), with 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824e(a).
5. Matthew R. Christiansen, FERC v. EPSA: Functionalism and the Electricity In-
dustry of the Future, 68 Stan. L. Rev. Online 100 (2016) (noting that FERC v. 
EPSA “may ultimately rank among the most significant energy law cases of all 
time”); Joel B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 
40 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. F. 1, 7 (2016) (terming FERC v. EPSA a “landmark” 
decision) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity 
Sector]; Anne Hoskins & Paul Roberti, The Essential Role of State Engagement in 
Demand Response, 40 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. F. 14, 14 (2016) (Commissioners 
of two state PUCs term FERC v. EPSA “a defining moment in evolution of 
competitive electric markets”).
6. Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 Tex. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 2016) (“For many decades following the New Deal, dual sovereignty 
coexisted rather peacefully with traditional utility rate regulation in energy 
industries.”); Hannah J. Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance 
Electric Grid Neutrality, 100 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 97, 99 (2015). For discussions 
of dual federalism, see generally Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: 
Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 Duke L.J. 1513 (2002), and Ernest A. Young, Dual 
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and advanced management of increasingly diverse sources 
of power on the grid to protect its reliability.12 New busi-
ness models, technologies and upstart competitors such as 
demand response aggregators and solar leasing firms are 
competing with traditional utilities.13 The utilities face a 
challenging competitive environment,14 as shown vividly by 
debates over net metering and solar demand charges in well 
over two dozen states that highlight important issues relat-
ing to the industry shift.15
Today’s grid is dramatically transforming into a Smart 
Grid.16 Technologies like battery storage,17 demand response, 
electric vehicles,18 and “microgrids” (self-sustaining areas 
largely disconnected from the traditional grid)19 are game 
changers. For example, if storage becomes more widely avail-
able and less expensive than Tesla’s “Powerwall,”20 consumers 
could keep the power they make from solar panels and pro-
vide it back to the grid when it would be most advantageous 
for them to do so.21 Not far off in the future, the electric 
grid may be a transactive system22 where power is traded23 
12. Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 12 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federal-
ism for the Smart Grid].
13. William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 
1614, 1677 (2014) (discussing solar leasing firms); Joel B. Eisen, Who Regu-
lates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority Over Demand Response Compensation 
in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 69 
(2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?] (discussing demand 
response aggregators).
14. Boyd, supra note 13, at 1677 (noting that with increased deployment of distrib-
uted generation, “incumbent utilities, . . . are left with significant reductions in 
demand from their higher-end distributed generation (DG) customers and a 
shrinking number of non-DG customers left to pay systems costs.”); see gener-
ally Edison Elec. Inst., Disruptive Challenges: Financial Implications 
and Strategic Responses to a Changing Retail Electric Business (2013), 
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf.
15. Boyd, supra note 13, at 1678; see also infra notes 165, 167, and accompany-
ing text.
16. See generally Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra 
note 12.
17. See generally Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case 
for Energy Storage, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 697 (2014).
18. Mark Detsky & Gabriella Stockmayer, Electric Vehicles: Rolling Over Barriers 
and Merging With Regulation, 40 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 477, 
478 (2016) (noting that “EVs are yet another nuance for utilities and regula-
tors managing the impacts of distributed generation, demand-side manage-
ment, smart grid, storage, net metering, and demand response technologies 
that have disrupted the electric utility market in the last decade”).
19. Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to Innova-
tion on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1712, 1719 (2014) [hereinafter 
Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff]; see also Sara C. Bronin, Curbing 
Energy Sprawl With Microgrids, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 547 (2010); Uma Outka, 
The Energy-Land Use Nexus, 27 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 245, 256 (2012). 
For a discussion of microgrids as a potential strategy for responding to climate 
change, see also James M. Van Nostrand, Keeping the Lights on During Super-
storm Sandy: Climate Change Adaptation and the Resiliency Benefits of Distrib-
uted Generation, 23 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 92 (2015).
20. Tesla Power Wall, Tesla, https://www.teslamotors.com/powerwall (last visited 
May 9, 2016).
21. Shelley Welton, Clean Energy Justice, Colo. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 7) (discussing a “participatory grid” that “allow[s] consumers 
to use power when it is cheapest, and to supply power back to the grid when 
it is most expensive, thereby maintaining affordability.”); Rossi, supra note 
6, at 4 (noting that “[c]ustomers . . . sometimes are even becoming energy 
suppliers themselves”).
22. See generally GridWise Architectural Council, GridWise Transactive 
Energy Framework Version 1.0 (2015), http://www.gridwiseac.org/pdfs/
te_framework_report_pnnl-22946.pdf (discussing the attributes of a transac-
tive energy system).
23. See generally Sharon Jacobs, Consumer Generation, Ecol. L.Q. (forthcoming 
rather than simply consumed. Recognizing this, California 
and New York are experimenting with overhauling the entire 
system in which electricity is distributed to customers.24 The 
watchword is change, and more of it is promised at a dizzy-
ing rate.
The grid’s architecture has also changed dramatically. The 
regional wholesale markets that now trade over two-thirds 
of the nation’s electricity under FERC oversight have existed 
only since the 1990s.25 And, as a result of the restructuring 
(partial deregulation) of the 1990s, another major change 
took place at the retail level. Consumers in sixteen states 
and the District of Columbia can choose to have their elec-
tricity delivered by suppliers other than their utilities.26 In 
Maryland, where the events leading to Hughes took place, 
roughly one-fourth of all residential customers are served in 
this fashion.27
The result is a complex, diverse and rapidly evolving 
system of electricity generation, transmission and delivery. 
The FPA’s drafters would have considerable difficulty rec-
ognizing today’s grid.28 The statute’s core provisions, how-
ever, are virtually unchanged since 1935,29 when FDR was 
a year away from trouncing Alf Landon, the number one 
movie was Clark Gable’s Mutiny on the Bounty, and a pound 
of sugar cost five cents. Under the FPA, FERC regulates 
the transmission of electricity in interstate commerce and 
rates, terms, and conditions of wholesale sales (any sales 
that are for resale, that is, not to an eventual consumer).30 
It also has the power to order a remedy if it finds a “rule, 
regulation, practice, or contract affecting such [wholesale] 
rate” to be “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or 
preferential.”31 The states regulate retail sales to end users, 
2016).
24. See discussion infra Part II.
25. Seven regional grid operators, known as “independent system operators” 
(ISOs) and “regional transmission organizations” (RTOs) today operate mar-
kets and “serve over one-half of the nation and provide two-thirds of the na-
tion’s electricity.” Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the 
Electric Grid, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1783 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s 
Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid]. For discussions of the devel-
opment of the wholesale markets, see Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, 
The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 141, 143 (2016), 
and David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 765, 769 (2008); see also Benefits of a Regional Market, Cal. 
Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., https://www.caiso.com/informed/Pages/Regio-
nalEnergyMarket/BenefitsofaRegionalEnergyMarket.aspx (last visited May 10, 
2016) (discussing the possible transformation of the California ISO into an 
energy market spanning the entire West).
26. Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://
www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (last vis-
ited May 10, 2016).
27. Electric Choice: Monthly Enrollment Reports, Md. Pub. Svc. Comm’n, http://
www.psc.state.md.us/electricity/electric-choice-monthly-enrollment-reports/ 
(last visited May 10, 2016) (providing March 2016 report, which shows 
21.7% of residential customers are served by retail suppliers).
28. Hammond & Spence, supra note 25, at 198 (noting that the FPA did not 
envision today’s wholesale markets); James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, 
Regulatory Federalism and Development of Electric Transmission: A Brewing 
Storm?, 35 Energy L.J. 71, 73 (2014) (noting that “[t]he electricity industry 
has changed in fundamental ways . . . never contemplated by the drafters of 
the FPA”).
29. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, 
at 1786.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b). FERC’s transmission jurisdiction is therefore much 
broader than its sale jurisdiction. Rossi, supra note 6, at 10 n.33.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).
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siting of power plants and transmission lines, and other 
matters.32 This jurisdictional divide between “wholesale” 
and “retail” reflected Congressional intent to close the 
“Attleboro gap,” named for the 1927 Supreme Court deci-
sion that proclaimed that the federal government regulated 
sales of electricity that crossed state lines.33
In 1935 and for decades thereafter, jurisdiction over the 
electric grid could be neatly fenced off at state borders.34 This 
bright line was typical of the early twentieth century’s dual 
federalism, which posited that federal and state regulatory 
authority could be separated neatly into exclusive spheres.35 
In today’s interconnected electricity network, this no longer 
makes sense. A system of shared responsibility is more appro-
priate than a jurisdictional bright line, as both the states and 
FERC are taking actions simultaneously to influence such 
matters as how many power plants get built and how much 
renewable energy is added to the grid.36 In this new envi-
ronment, many state or federal actions can have impacts on 
both retail electricity rates and wholesale markets. A bright 
line jurisdictional test is impractical in these situations,37 and 
forces an arbitrary choice that deprives a level of government 
of opportunities to promote innovation.
Instead, a system of shared, or concurrent federalism, 
would be more useful. If designed properly, it would mini-
mize jurisdictional disputes and promote the respective capa-
bilities of FERC and the states for innovating on the grid, 
while protecting reliability and other attributes that are cen-
tral to the grid’s operation.38 A modern analogue is environ-
mental law’s “cooperative federalism,” where states and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) share responsi-
bility for implementing environmental laws. But the eighty-
year-old framework still calls for FERC and the states to 
32. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (explaining that FERC authority does not extend to sales 
beyond those at wholesale); see also Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Trans-
form the Electric Grid, supra note 25, at 1789. FPA section 201(a) provides that 
FERC’s authority “shall only extend to those matters which are not subject 
to regulation by the States,” and appears to give broad leeway to the states, 
but has consistently been interpreted as “’prefatory’ in nature, a mere ‘policy 
declaration’ that ‘cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even 
if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose.’” 
Rossi, supra note 6, at 15; see Brief for Energy Law Scholars Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners, at 14, FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 
(2016) (No. 14-840).
33. See generally Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 
U.S. 83 (1927).
34. Nordhaus, supra note 7, at 207 (noting that, during this time, “[i]t was clear 
which sales were at wholesale and which at retail, and the FERC was fairly 
readily able to distinguish transmission from distribution”).
35. See generally Rossi, supra note 6.
36. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, 
at 1789; Rossi, supra note 6, at 4.
37. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 27 (observing that “the FPA’s allocation 
of federal-state authority over practices affecting rates cannot always result in a 
strict separation of authority, as a jurisdictional bright line would dictate”).
38. Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 1621, 1627 (2015) 
(noting that scholars are beginning to discuss an energy federalism model “that 
would treat federal and state jurisdiction not as independent or mere substi-
tutes but, instead, as interdependent and complementary”); see generally Hari 
M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 Md. L. 
Rev. 773 (2013); Rossi, supra note 6; cf. Heather Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 
53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1549, 1551 (2012) (“It would be useful if scholars 
were more attentive to the fact that the questions federalism raises need not 
involve an either/or answer. Often they will involve a both/and.”).
operate independently. This is the last vestige of dual federal-
ism, which elsewhere is long gone from the national scene.39
The Supreme Court could not act simply because the 
FPA’s bright line may not fit today’s realities. Without Con-
gressional action, of course, the Court could not change the 
FPA’s text, nor could it render an advisory opinion to rein-
terpret the FPA. Under the Constitution, there must be a 
case or controversy that the Court can hear.40 Even that is 
no guarantee that the case will find its way to the Supreme 
Court, which controls its docket and takes few of the cases 
presented to it.41 Usually, the Court takes cases where two or 
more circuit courts have split on the issues.42 Hughes featured 
no circuit split, for the two Circuits that considered the issues 
agreed about the FPA’s reach.43 Nor did FERC v. EPSA, 
which originated in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and 
ONEOK, which involved a Ninth Circuit decision without 
any corresponding decision of another Circuit.44
In the absence of a circuit split or a case invoking its 
original jurisdiction, the Court chooses cases it believes are 
of utmost national importance.45 Here, the Court felt com-
pelled to tackle three cases that squarely presented variations 
on the question introduced above: which level of govern-
ment should control the transition underway in the electric 
grid? Inevitably, given the concurrent actions by both levels 
of government, conflicts were bound to—and did—arise. 
The Court’s decisions addressed these conflicts and aimed to 
allocate responsibility for decisions affecting the grid going 
forward, within the limitations of statutory language written 
many years ago.46
In Part I, this Article describes the results in all three 
decisions, and explains the guidance the Court has given 
for future cases. The purpose is not to synthesize the results 
into a unified doctrine, which would be inconsistent with the 
Court’s approach in these cases. ONEOK, the Hughes major-
ity opinion, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Hughes, and 
Justice Kagan’s “notable solicitude” for the states in FERC 
v. EPSA, all demonstrate the Court’s reluctance to fashion 
a comprehensive new jurisdictional bright line. Part I con-
cludes that the Court has not applied a single test for deter-
mining the limits of federal and state jurisdiction. Instead, it 
has articulated several different guiding principles, each of 
which may have application in specific situations.
39. Young, supra note 6, at 139 (noting that “‘dual federalism[ ]’ died an ignomini-
ous death in 1937 or shortly thereafter”).
40. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
41. Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking 
Docket, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1219 (2012) (“Since the 2005 Term, the 
Court has decided an average of 80 cases per Term[.]”).
42. Sup. Ct. R. 10; Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme 
Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 Geo. L.J. 271, 272 (terming the circuit split 
the Court’s “most potent case-selection tool”).
43. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct at 1296–99 (2016).
44. See FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 760–89 (2016); ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1591 
(2015).
45. Sup. Ct. R. 10. In its petition for certiorari in FERC v. EPSA, for example, 
the Solicitor General stated that “[t]he question whether FERC has authority 
to regulate the participation of demand-response providers in wholesale-elec-
tricity [sic] markets has substantial national importance and thus warrants this 
Court’s review.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply 
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840).
46. See discussion infra Sections I.A, I.B, I.C.
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Parts II and III consider the impacts of the three decisions 
on FERC and the states. Part II discusses and applies the 
FERC v. EPSA test for FERC’s authority under the FPA to 
regulate “practices” “directly affecting” wholesale rates. This 
new authority empowers FERC to take action to substantially 
overhaul the electric grid.47 The analysis in Part II focuses 
on the intersection of FERC’s new authority with ambitious 
state programs underway to transform the grid. The first is 
California’s regional grid operator’s proposal to integrate dis-
tributed energy resources (“DERs”) into wholesale markets. 
The second is the component of the New York “Reforming 
the Energy Vision” (“REV”) proposal that would create “dis-
tribution system platform providers” (“DSPPs”) to coordi-
nate activities involving aggregation of electricity resources 
and distribution to end users.
Examining the intersection of state and federal jurisdic-
tion in the implementation of these programs allows for an 
assessment of FERC’s role in reshaping the grid, and the 
potential for shared or concurrent jurisdiction. In both cases, 
Part II concludes that FERC can use its new authority to 
influence policy development. It identifies areas where the 
states and FERC share jurisdictional authority, and notes 
areas where FERC and the states could develop coopera-
tive arrangements that promote the states’ ambitious visions 
while minimizing jurisdictional disputes.
Part III discusses and applies the holding and dicta of 
Hughes in the context of two state initiatives. One is a hypo-
thetical property tax exemption granted by a Virginia city to 
provide an incentive for a power plant to locate there. The 
other is a New York program proposed in early 2016 to pro-
vide support payments to keep three of the state’s nuclear 
power plants in operation. Part III concludes that Hughes 
raises more questions than it answers about which state initia-
tives are permissible. This may be the new bottom line about 
both federal and state electricity regulators’ authority after the 
three decisions studied here: more questions than answers.
I. The Three Decisions
A. ONEOK v. Learjet
The first of the three decisions was 2015’s ONEOK v. Lear-
jet. In 2003, trade publications were a benchmark for set-
ting prices in the natural gas market, and these publications 
relied on voluntary price reports from natural gas traders.48 
FERC discovered that some traders had been reporting 
false price information that skewed natural gas prices.49 A 
group of gas purchasers then brought state antitrust suits 
against the interstate natural gas pipelines, claiming they 
had overpaid for the natural gas they purchased, because 
47. See discussion infra Part II.
48. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1597; Emily Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional 
Boundaries: A Call for Course Correction, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Docket (Oct. 
Term 2014).
49. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1597 (“FERC found that false reporting had involved 
inflating the volume of trades, omitting trades, and adjusting the price of 
trades, . . . That is, sometimes those who reported information simply fabri-
cated it.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
the pipelines had allegedly manipulated the price indices.50 
They claimed they had been overcharged due to pipelines’ 
manipulation that affected prices in both wholesale and 
retail natural gas markets.
The Court was therefore forced to choose whether FERC 
or state courts held sway. There was no suggestion that the 
NGA expressly foreclosed the state antitrust actions. Instead, 
the pipelines (and the federal government, supporting them) 
argued that the state actions were barred by implied preemp-
tion. There are two types of implied preemption: “field” and 
“conflict” preemption.51 “Field preemption” occurs when the 
federal law is so comprehensive that Congress has intended 
for federal regulation to occupy the entire field and displace 
any state laws.52 “Conflict preemption” consists of two differ-
ent varieties: “impossibility” preemption (“compliance with 
both state and federal law is impossible”)53 and “purposes 
and objectives” (or “obstacle”) preemption, under which “the 
state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”54 
In all of these situations, the statute is held to have implicitly 
preempted the state’s action and federal law prevails.55
The litigants in ONEOK focused on the doctrine of field 
preemption, and made no attempt to argue that conflict pre-
emption governed.56 Under the field preemption doctrine, 
if federal supremacy is based on a statute (as here with the 
NGA), the court looks to Congressional purpose and decides 
whether Congress intended for federal regulators to compre-
hensively occupy a field.57 In that case, federal law preempts 
all state laws on the subject. The relevant provision of the 
NGA was section 5(a),58 which contains the same “prac-
tices affecting rates” authority as the FPA. With respect to 
a wholesale rate for natural gas transactions, this subsection 
gives FERC authority to determine whether “any rule, regu-
lation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or 
classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, 
or preferential,”59 and to order a remedy.
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion held that FERC did not 
have exclusive authority to protect pipeline customers under 
this statutory provision.60 The Court found that the NGA 
did not foreclose actions taken under state antitrust laws to 
recover damages for manipulation of the natural gas mar-
50. Id. at 1598.
51. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 226 (2000).
52. Id. at 227; see also ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595; Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Au-
thority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, at 1845.
53. Nelson, supra note 51, at 227–28; see also ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595; Eisen, 
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, at 
1845–46.
54. Nelson, supra note 51, at 228 n.14 (citing a number of cases, including an 
energy law decision mentioned in ONEOK); see also ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 
1595; Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Eisen, 
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, at 
1845.
55. Nelson, supra note 51, at 228–29; see also ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595.
56. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595 (“Nor have the parties argued at any length that 
these state suits conflict with federal law.”).
57. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595; Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption 
and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1283, 1355 (2013).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a).
59. Id.
60. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600–01.
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ket.61 It rejected a field preemption argument that would have 
barred state laws if “the matter on which the State asserts the 
right to act is in any way regulated by the [NGA].”62 Instead, 
the Court stated, preemption of state laws must be deter-
mined with reference to “the target at which the state law 
aims in determining whether [the] law is pre-empted.”63
The Court then drew a distinction between “‘traditional’ 
state regulation,” such as antitrust and state blue sky laws, 
which “are not aimed at natural-gas companies in particular, 
but rather all businesses in the marketplace.”64 Because the 
antitrust laws govern a wide variety of industries, and not 
just natural gas pipelines, the state lawsuits would stand. If, 
however, the Court had been presented with a state law that 
“aimed directly at interstate purchasers and wholesales for 
resale,”65 the NGA would have preempted it. There was no 
further guidance about the distinction between traditional 
regulation and that which “aim[s] directly” at the wholesale 
markets. That would come later in Hughes.
B. FERC v. EPSA
In FERC v. EPSA, Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a six-
Justice majority, upheld Order 745,66 a FERC rule requiring 
that regional grid operators compensate aggregated bids of 
“demand response” (reductions in electricity consumption 
in response to grid emergencies or price signals)67 at the same 
wholesale market price paid to generators in the wholesale 
energy markets.68 In its rule, FERC recognized that using 
demand-side measures to reduce peak stress on the grid can 
help balance supply and demand, improve reliability, and 
decrease peak electricity prices.69 In the D.C. Circuit, the asso-
ciation representing power producers and its supporters had 
argued successfully that FERC did not have authority under 
the FPA to make this rule, and that demand response was 
wholly within state jurisdiction because it affected end users.70
The Court reversed this decision.71 It confirmed FERC’s 
authority over “practices” affecting wholesale rates for elec-
tricity, stated that demand response was such a practice, and 
61. See id. at 1601.
62. Id. at 1600–01. The Court noted that FERC had not argued that field preemp-
tion applied, so it need not address whether such a finding might be entitled to 
deference under City of Arlington. See id. at 1602–03.
63. Id. at 1599.
64. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600–01.
65. Id. at 1600.
66. See Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 
Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (Mar. 15, 2011).
67. FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767; see Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path 
to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 5, at 1–2. For analysis of demand 
response and Order 745, see Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 
13 (discussing and advocating judicial affirmance of Order 745), and Richard 
J. Pierce Jr., A Primer on Demand Response and a Critique of FERC Order 745, 
102 Geo. Wash. J. Energy & Envtl. L. 102 (2011).
68. See FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767.
69. See id. at 767; see also Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity 
Sector, supra note 5, at 3–4.
70. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 223–24 (D.C. Cir. 
2014), rev’d and remanded, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 
(2016). Had this decision stood, it would have “threatened to disable [demand 
response], with serious implications for consumers as well as DR suppliers.” 
Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 16.
71. See FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767.
upheld Order 745.72 It rejected the argument that demand 
response was exclusively a state matter, finding that adding 
it to wholesale markets impacted prices in those markets.73 
Even if its policies would have impacts on the states and retail 
electricity rates, FERC was not foreclosed from acting.74
The Court articulated a standard for upholding FERC 
initiatives such as Order 745: FERC can regulate practices 
if wholesale rates are “directly” affected.75 To the Court, the 
demand response rule was a prime example of this because 
injecting demand reductions into wholesale markets imme-
diately impacts wholesale prices.76 As it stated succinctly, 
“Wholesale demand response, in short, is all about reduc-
ing wholesale rates; so too, then, the rules and practices that 
determine how those programs operate.”77 The Court con-
cluded, “it is hard to think of a practice” that has a more 
direct impact on wholesale rates.78 It contrasted this to activi-
ties that have “indirect or tangential impacts” on wholesale 
markets, rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s argument that FERC 
could regulate the steel or labor markets if it so chose.79
As opaque as the “directly affecting” test may appear, it 
has solid grounding in over 100 years of doctrine dating to 
federal regulation of railroads in the early twentieth centu-
ry.80 The FERC v. EPSA test was not fashioned from whole 
cloth. Instead, it was the natural evolution of decades of judi-
cial decisions in a number of regulated industries whose gov-
erning statutes granted federal agencies authority to regulate 
“practices affecting rates,” including, of course, the electricity 
industry.81 Originally, “practices affecting rates” jurisdiction 
focused on discrimination by individual firms such as rail-
roads.82 As the era of modern regulatory statutes—includ-
ing the FPA—began in the 1930s, “practices” were those 
required to be listed in rate-setting tariffs, providing notice 
to customers and obligating utilities to provide service under 
tariff terms and conditions.83 Today, as the industry focus 
has shifted to markets—and FERC’s oversight has shifted to 
ensuring that market structures lead to just and reasonable 
rates—“practices affecting rates” means details of market 
operations and the activities that directly influence them.84
The well-recognized limit of “directness”85 has two essen-
tial components. The first requires the impact on wholesale 
72. See id. at 773–75.
73. See id. at 776.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 774.
76. FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774. 
77. Id.
78. Id. at 775.
79. Id. at 774.
80. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, 
at 1797.
81. Id. at 115; Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 
supra note 5, at 6.
82. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, 
at 1797–1806.
83. Id. at 125–30.
84. Id. at 131–32. The tariff continues to be used as a regulatory device, even 
though other industries have discarded it. Id. at 131 n.145 (noting statu-
tory reforms that discarded New Deal-era statutes). However, its nature has 
changed; it now is a document listing market features and operations, with 
FERC oversight and approval. Id.
85. Rossi, supra note 6, at 36 (terming this an “established test”).
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rates to be proximate in both time and causative effect.86 
The FERC v. EPSA majority discussed this aspect of the 
test’s articulation in California ISO,87 where the D.C. Cir-
cuit struck down FERC’s action requiring that the California 
ISO choose its board of directors in a specific manner. There, 
the D.C. Circuit concluded that FERC had provided no evi-
dence to show that a change in corporate governance could 
influence rates.88 Contrast the situation of demand response: 
as the FERC v. EPSA court observed, injecting demand 
reductions into wholesale markets has an immediate impact 
on rates.
Under case law both preceding and following California 
ISO, it is not necessary that there be an immediate cause and 
effect relationship between the action evaluated and whole-
sale rates.89 Reflecting this, the D.C. Circuit in California ISO 
empowered FERC to regulate practices “that directly affect 
the rate or are closely related to the rate[.]”90 However, the 
presence of too many intermediate actions before any poten-
tial impact would be felt negates an action’s directness. Cali-
fornia ISO is a good example of this: it would take numerous 
actions after a change in a board of directors to influence 
market rates. The D.C. Circuit thought it “absurd” to call 
this a practice affecting rates, concluding that FERC could 
not regulate “those remote things beyond the rate structure 
that might in some sense indirectly or ultimately” affect whole-
sale rates.91
A D.C. Circuit decision that found a closer link between 
FERC’s action and wholesale rates is South Carolina Pub-
lic Service Authority v. FERC (“SCPSA”).92 SCPSA upheld 
FERC’s Order 1000, which required that regional transmis-
sion organizations (“RTOs”) engage in transmission plan-
ning processes and devise methods of allocating the costs of 
new transmission lines.93 It would take numerous intermedi-
ate actions before a regional transmission plan would impact 
rates by reducing congestion, including all of the local and 
state approvals necessary to site and construct an individual 
transmission line. Still, the court found that regional trans-
mission planning was a practice affecting rates, distinguish-
ing FERC’s attempt to influence corporate governance in 
California ISO.94 Thus, the link to a change in wholesale rates 
need not be immediate, as long as there is a proximate rela-
tionship between FERC’s action and market rates.95
A second component of “directness” is economic. The 
practice being regulated must have a quantifiable impact on 
86. Id. at 57.
87. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see 
also Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 
25, at 1830–33 (discussing the decision of the D.C. Circuit).
88. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 403.
89. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 
25, at 1829 (discussing the origins of this interpretation in regulations and 
case law).
90. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 403 (emphasis added).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
93. Id. (upholding Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission 
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, 36 FERC ¶ 61,051 
(2011)).
94. Id. For example, rates have to increase or decrease.
95. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, 
at 1828–29.
wholesale rates.96 Moreover, the California ISO court, draw-
ing upon other cases interpreting the “practices affecting 
rates” language, used a threshold that rates must be impacted 
“significantly.”97 In FERC v. EPSA, a significant impact on 
rates is implied from the large amounts of demand response 
bids and their impacts on market rates.
Decisions upholding FERC authority over such mat-
ters as capacity market designs had discussed this modern 
understanding of FERC’s jurisdiction over practices affect-
ing wholesale market rates.98 Before FERC v. EPSA, how-
ever, no one decision had cogently articulated both the test 
and directness limitation with its analytical depth and rigor. 
FERC v. EPSA crystallized the doctrine and distilled it into a 
test that can be applied in future judicial decisions. Coupled 
with the well-recognized limitation that FERC’s initiatives 
have a “direct” impact on wholesale rates over which it has 
jurisdiction, FERC v. EPSA’s grant of authority to FERC 
yields a clearer picture of FERC’s role in a system of concur-
rent jurisdiction.99
FERC v. EPSA also swept away the bright line that demar-
cated state and federal jurisdiction. By explaining both 
FERC’s Order 745 and states’ actions in the same decision, 
the Court demonstrated that FERC can and will act at the 
same time as the states.100 Demand response is a prototypi-
cal example of concurrent action.101 The Court mentioned 
FERC’s “notable solicitude” for state demand response pro-
grams, and states can conduct a wide range of programs with-
out involving FERC.102 For example, a state could approve a 
utility’s proposal to conduct a demand response program for 
its own retail customers.103 This could have impacts in the 
wholesale markets, as the utility program might allow it to 
reduce its purchases from the wholesale markets. However, as 
long as the state-sanctioned program did not involve bidding 
into wholesale markets, FERC could not regulate it.104
Yet as the Court stated, FERC is not precluded from act-
ing even if a state has taken steps to promote or regulate an 
activity, as long as it does not interfere with matters expressly 
reserved to the states under the FPA.105 While this would 
96. Id.
97. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 403.
98. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, 
at 1824–33.
99. See generally Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 
supra note 5; Rossi, supra note 6; Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7.
100. Nor is this foreclosed by the text of the FPA itself. Rossi, supra note 6, at 45; 
Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 27 (“[T]o the extent the FPA does not 
expressly foreclose it, the statute authorizes both federal and state regulators to 
regulate the same activities in energy markets.”).
101. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 5, 
at 8.
102. FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779; Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 18 
(“Post-EPSA, states have a range of options to further DR’s growth.”).
103. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 5, 
at 8.
104. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 28 (“If a retail customer forgoing energy 
consumption does not choose to bid into wholesale demand response markets, 
it simply is not subject to FERC’s jurisdiction under the FPA.”).
105. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, 
at 1828 (“FERC’s authority extends to requiring power transmission planning 
and cost allocation methods, notwithstanding traditional state authority over 
transmission siting, because Order 1000 did not expressly intrude on states’ 
authority to approve individual transmission lines.”).
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seem to wall off certain activities for exclusive state action, 
actions by FERC will narrow state choices. Upholding 
FERC’s regional capacity models and transmission planning, 
for example, constrains the states’ ability to plan for and 
build new infrastructure.106 This contemplation of simulta-
neous action, and potential intersection between policies of 
the two levels of government, consigns dual federalism in 
electricity law to the dustbin of history.107
C. Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing
FERC v. EPSA did not address how far the states could go 
in influencing the grid’s future direction, when their actions 
might impact the wholesale markets. This issue arose in 
Hughes in the context of a Maryland law that provided incen-
tives for a new power plant to locate in the state.108 The state 
tied its incentive to prices in the capacity market that the PJM 
regional transmission organization, the grid operator in the 
region that includes Maryland, has operated since 2007.109 
Capacity markets came into existence when regional plan-
ners recognized that electricity market prices alone would 
not prompt construction of new power plants.110 The PJM 
capacity market, known as the “Reliability Pricing Model,”111 
is designed to provide additional payments to generators that 
commit to sell power into PJM over the next three years. 
PJM requires112 load-serving entities (“LSEs,” the term for 
utilities and retail suppliers that serve customers)113 to pur-
chase capacity in its Base Residual Auctions, which are con-
ducted three years in advance of a designated delivery year.114
Maryland officials believed the payments to generators 
from these auctions were insufficient to induce construction 
of new power plants in the state.115 The resulting state law 
106. Nordhaus, supra note 7, at 211 (noting that the Fourth and Third Circuits’ 
decisions on the Maryland and New Jersey programs “go far beyond exclud-
ing ‘subsidized’ resources from capacity markets—they bar their construction 
and operation altogether”); cf. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 
569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding FERC approval of the ISO-New 
England capacity market under FERC’s “practice affecting rates” authority, 
notwithstanding its impacts on states, given that it did not directly call for 
construction of a specific power plant).
107. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 5, 
at 9.
108. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1290.
109. Joseph Bowring, Capacity Markets in PJM, 2 Econ. Energy & Envtl. Pol’y 
47, 50 (2013).
110. Id.
111. Capacity Market (RPM), PJM Interconnection, LLC, http://www.pjm.
com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx (last visited May 11, 2016).
112. The requirement to purchase capacity is known as the “capacity obligation.” 
RPM Base Residual Auction FAQs, PJM Interconnection, LLC, http://www.
pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/rpm-base-residual-
auction-faqs.ashx (last visited May 11, 2016).
113. A “load-serving entity” is an entity that “[s]ecures energy and transmission 
service (and related interconnected operations services) to serve the electrical 
demand and energy requirements of its end-use customers.” Appendix 5B State-
ment of Compliance Registry Criteria, N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp. 6 (Mar. 
19, 2015), http://www.nerc.com/FilingsOrders/us/RuleOfProcedureDL/
Appendix_5B_RegistrationCriteria_20150319.pdf.
114. Supply can include “new generators, upgrades for existing generators, demand 
response (consumers reducing electricity use in exchange for payment) ener-
gy efficiency and transmission upgrades.” Learning Center, Capacity Market 
(RPM), PJM Interconnection, LLC, http://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/
buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx (last visited May 11, 2016).
115. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1290.
created a “contract for differences” between the winning bid-
der and LSEs.116 If the contract price exceeded the capac-
ity market price, LSEs would pay the difference to the plant 
owner.117 Because PJM’s capacity obligation requirement 
already obligates LSEs to purchase capacity for the demand 
they serve, paying the incremental difference under Mary-
land law as well would leave the LSEs paying a premium 
above the market price.118
A group of challengers claimed this interfered with pricing 
in the wholesale markets, and the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed.119 It found that the doctrine of field preemp-
tion applied, concluding that FERC’s regulation of wholesale 
markets under the FPA is so all-encompassing that it left no 
room for the Maryland state law.120 As Hughes reached the 
Court, observers believed that the Court should find an alter-
native to the appellate court’s field preemption approach.121 
If that approach were upheld, FERC could void all state ini-
tiatives that might impact the wholesale markets, no matter 
how substantial the impacts and how legitimate the states’ 
goals.122 That is too imbalanced and blunt an instrument to 
govern the federal-state relationship,123 as FERC v. EPSA had 
made clear that states have significant authority over matters 
affecting the electric grid. Given the judicial presumption 
against preemption in these mixed jurisdictional settings,124 
applying field preemption in Hughes seemed unwise. Finally, 
FERC was not a party in Hughes, and therefore invoked the 
preemption issue only in an amicus brief. This could have 
led the Court to the same restraint it used in ONEOK. Or 
it could have used the primary jurisdiction doctrine,125 and 
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 8 n.5 (providing hypothetical examples with sample calculations).
119. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub 
nom. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg. LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). The Third 
Circuit struck down a similar New Jersey law in PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solo-
mon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
120. Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 475 (citing N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 
372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963) (“Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy 
an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement 
federal law.”)).
121. Robin Bravender, Supreme Court to Hear Major Grid Case Without Scalia, E&E 
Publishing, LLC: Greenwire, Feb. 22, 2016 (quoting the author and Mat-
thew Christiansen of the NYU Guarini Center). As Jim Rossi has cogently 
observed, the difference might not have mattered. The ultimate analysis would 
be similar in any event because “any energy field preemption issues under these 
statutes ultimately depends on first assessing the issue as an obstacle or conflict 
preemption case.” Rossi, supra note 6, at 54.
122. Bravender, supra note 121 (quoting the author for the proposition that, in 
Hughes, “say[ing] that the state program is broadly pre-empted ‘would appear 
to give FERC complete authority over the wholesale markets, and that would 
be inconsistent’ with the demand-response ruling”); cf. Rossi, supra note 6, 
at 54; Rossi & Hutton, supra note 57, at 1355 (recommending against field 
preemption generally for electricity law and noting that “judicial decisions 
seem to disfavor field preemption based on the mere possibility of federal 
regulation as an overbroad approach that is inconsistent with any recognition 
of state autonomy”).
123. Rossi, supra note 6, at 54.
124. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599 (“[W]here (as here) a state law can be applied to 
non-jurisdictional as well as jurisdictional sales, we must proceed cautiously, 
finding pre-emption only where detailed examination convinces us that a mat-
ter falls within the pre-empted field as defined by our precedents.”).
125. The primary jurisdiction doctrine is a judge-made tool that applies “when a 
claim is cognizable in federal court but requires resolution of an issue of first 
impression, or of a particularly complicated issue that Congress has committed 
to a regulatory agency.” Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s 
Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. 997, 1026 (2007) (quoting Syntek Semi-
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not decided the case at all until FERC weighed in through a 
regulation or other means.
Some believed the Court might adopt a conflict preemp-
tion approach.126 While Congressional purpose would again 
have been the touchstone, a decision relying on conflict pre-
emption might have allowed a range of state laws to stand. 
The Court could also have expounded on the ONEOK test, 
under which a state law is preempted if it is “aimed directly at 
interstate purchasers and wholesales for resale.”127 There, the 
Court focused on the state law’s regulatory scope: did it regu-
late businesses generally, or only the natural gas (or, by impli-
cation) electricity industry? As noted above, the ONEOK 
Court distinguished examples of the former, such as antitrust 
laws and securities blue sky laws, as “traditional” regulation 
affecting “all businesses in the marketplace.”128 Under this 
analysis, the Maryland law would fall, for it aimed as directly 
as one can imagine at FERC-jurisdictional markets, affecting 
only the amount the power plant owner receives from them. 
But the use of other, more broad-based state laws to promote 
power plant development would presumably be permissible.
Instead of doing any of this, the Court recited the basics 
of preemption doctrine, but avoided crafting a sweeping 
preemption principle or elaborating on the ONEOK test. It 
issued a narrow decision that, like FERC v. EPSA, hewed 
closely to the statutory text.129 The Court overturned the 
Maryland law because it interfered with the system of set-
ting wholesale rates through the capacity auctions.130 By 
conditioning payment under the contract on the amount 
the generator received in the wholesale market, the Mary-
land program took the market payment as an input and gave 
the power plant owner the ability to change it. It allowed 
the power plant owner to consider the subsidy and therefore 
bid differently into the market, which, the Court stated, 
would distort the market design and “disregard” the whole-
sale rate.131 Notwithstanding the Court’s rote enunciation of 
preemption principles, this decision was grounded solely in 
an interpretation of the FPA. This was evidenced in Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion stating that she agreed with 
the majority decision on that basis.132
The Court also cautioned that it was only rejecting this 
particular subsidy program:
Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland’s program only 
because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required 
by FERC. We therefore need not and do not address the 
permissibility of various other measures States might 
employ to encourage development of new or clean genera-
tion, including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsi-
dies, construction of state-owned generation facilities, or 
conductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 285 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
When a court employs this doctrine, it refers the matter to the agency and 
may choose to retain jurisdiction while the agency makes a decision. Reiter v. 
Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993).
126. See, e.g., Bravender, supra note 121.
127. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600.
128. Id. at 1600–01.
129. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294, 1299.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1299.
132. Id. at 1299–1301 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
re-regulation of the energy sector. Nothing in this opin-
ion should be read to foreclose Maryland and other States 
from encouraging production of new or clean generation 
through measures “untethered to a generator’s wholesale 
market participation.” So long as a State does not condi-
tion payment of funds on capacity clearing the auction, the 
State’s program would not suffer from the fatal defect that 
renders Maryland’s program unacceptable.133
This shows the Justices’ concern about inhibiting states 
from pursuing the wide variety of means they have at their 
disposal for pursuing legitimate state goals such as encourag-
ing new clean energy development. At the same time, if the 
state were to “condition” the incentive on market payments, 
or the measure is otherwise “tethered” to wholesale rates, 
the initiative cannot stand.134 As Part III will discuss,135 this 
leaves considerable uncertainty going forward.
II. FERC Authority in a System of 
Concurrent Jurisdiction
FERC v. EPSA’s grant of authority to FERC to regulate 
“practices” “directly affecting” wholesale rates signals a 
momentous shift in the arc of electricity law. As this Part will 
demonstrate, it has far-reaching implications going forward. 
This jurisdictional standard gives FERC considerable leeway 
to regulate innovative activities taking place on the electric 
grid, as long as it can demonstrate direct impacts on the 
wholesale markets.136 Many situations, like demand response 
bid into wholesale markets, will involve activities that have 
impacts at both the wholesale and retail levels. This is no 
longer a bar to action by FERC. FERC’s authority will turn 
on the character of the activity and its impacts on wholesale 
markets, not a formalistic assessment of whether the activity 
is “wholesale” or “retail” in nature.137
After FERC v. EPSA, the states and FERC have dual 
and concurrent roles to pursue electricity initiatives that 
might reinforce each other’s actions.138 As Professor Jim 
Rossi and former FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff, who 
led FERC’s development of Order 745, have stated, “[s]tate-
133. Id. at 1299.
134. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
135. See discussion infra Part III.
136. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 
5, at 8; Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra 
note 25, at 1834 (demonstrating that FERC could justify a carbon price in 
the wholesale markets under this authority); see also Christopher J. Bateman 
& James T.B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 
38 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 276, 329–32 (2014) (claiming that the FPA autho-
rizes FERC to set “social-cost wholesale rates” that incorporate environmen-
tal costs).
137. Christiansen, supra note 5, at 102 (terming this a “deeply functionalist and 
pragmatic approach to the FPA”).
138. With respect to this contemplation of concurrent actions in demand response, 
see Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 
5, at 8; Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 28 (“This ‘opt out’ option allows 
FERC to set basic expectations for demand response resources in wholesale 
markets without discouraging state regulators from experimenting with a wide 
range of complementary approaches to promote energy conservation.”); see also 
Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 16 (“[T]here is no longer any lingering un-
certainty about the dual rights of FERC and the states to continue to develop 
policies that encourage DR.”).
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led policy experimentation with customer energy resources 
is consistent with the basic jurisdictional principles FERC 
endorsed in its regulation of demand response.”139 Much 
post-EPSA commentary uses language like “adjacent,” 
“complementary” and “experimentation” to describe this 
new policy environment.140
Let a thousand flowers bloom, this suggests. And opti-
mism can be the watchword of the moment, because FERC v. 
EPSA did not require FERC to override specific state laws. In 
FERC v. EPSA, FERC’s primary opponents were power gen-
erators, who objected to competition in the wholesale markets 
from demand-side participation. States split on Order 745; 
while some objected, some supported it.141 As a result, the 
Court upheld FERC’s authority against EPSA’s arguments, 
while simultaneously supporting state demand response pro-
grams. Even Hughes, where the Court rejected the Maryland 
law, nodded to states’ flexibility by listing actions the Court 
believed states could take.142
However, the potential for conflict will not remain in the 
shadows for long. One of FERC v. EPSA’s most significant 
contributions to electricity law is its endorsement of a dual 
role for end users of electricity. They can act simultaneously 
both as consumers and providers of resources to the electric 
grid.143 As two state public utility Commissioners recently 
noted, this empowers FERC to expand consumer partici-
pation in the wholesale markets.144 That is wholly within 
FERC’s authority, even if it brings FERC into areas where the 
states have previously acted alone. As Rossi and Wellinghoff 
put it, “it is inevitable that FERC’s jurisdiction will expand 
into some arenas state regulators once considered exclusively 
their own.”145
And once that happens, solicitude for the states will 
only extend so far. Under FERC v. EPSA, FERC has ple-
nary authority over the wholesale markets’ structure and 
operation,146 so a state cannot dictate the mechanics of mar-
ket operations. Thus, deciding who may be a market par-
139. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 28.
140. See generally Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5; Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 
7; cf. William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Rate Design and 
Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 810, 841–76 (2016) 
(discussing numerous state experiments in the electric grid).
141. Nine states filed an amicus brief jointly in opposition to Order 745. Brief 
Amici Curiae of North Carolina Utilities Commission et al., FERC v. Elec. 
Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840). Twelve more joined 
another brief in opposition. Brief of Indiana, Oklahoma, and Ten States as 
Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents, FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 
136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840). Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and 
several other states supported FERC, as did various state administrative agen-
cies. Brief for the State of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae, FERC v. Elec. Pwr. 
Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840); Joint States’ Reply Brief 
on the Merits, FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 
14-840).
142. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298–99.
143. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 5, 
at 7.
144. Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 14 (noting that FERC v. EPSA “reinforces 
FERC’s authority to ensure that any reliance on markets as a substitute for tra-
ditional cost-of-service regulation should employ market designs that promote 
greater participation in the wholesale marketplace”).
145. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 27.
146. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, 
at 1832; see also FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774.
ticipant is exclusively within FERC’s purview.147 Suppose a 
state were to prohibit all generators making electricity from 
wind from selling into the wholesale markets. That prohibi-
tion would fall.148 Order 745 included a similar provision: 
a state could bar demand response firms from taking part 
in wholesale markets. While the Court noted this provision, 
it did not take the additional step of requiring it in Order 
745 or any other initiative expanding wholesale market par-
ticipation.149 Suppose, for example, that states chose to block 
firms from selling demand response into wholesale markets, 
which Order 745 allows. And further suppose that FERC 
decided to promulgate a new rule that eliminated the veto. 
If, as a result of these barriers, it found undue discrimina-
tion remained to market participation of demand response, 
FERC’s rule would survive scrutiny.150
What could FERC do next? This Part will discuss two 
examples of how boldly FERC could use the “directly affect-
ing” authority to craft policies for integrating clean and 
renewable energy into the electric grid, with environmental 
benefits such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The first 
involves a hypothetical nationwide extension of the proposal 
by California’s regional grid operator to integrate DERs 
into wholesale markets. DERs are the small-scale resources 
on the customer side of the electric system, such as rooftop 
solar, energy storage, plug-in electric vehicles, and demand 
response.151 The second involves the New York proposal 
under its “Reforming the Energy Vision” (REV proceeding152 
to create DSPPs) to coordinate activities involving aggrega-
tion of DERs and administration of markets for matching 
buyers and sellers of DERs.
Both proposals involve the intersection of state and federal 
jurisdiction, even under pre-2015 jurisprudence. For example, 
California contemplates that aggregators of DERs will sell 
these resources into the wholesale markets, which would be 
within FERC’s jurisdiction. New York DSPPs will continue 
to purchase and sell electricity in the New York Independent 
System Operator (“NYISO”) wholesale markets. But, as this 
Part will demonstrate, FERC’s “directly affecting” authority 
extends its reach beyond jurisdiction over wholesale transac-
tions, to shaping or even requiring specific policy designs. 
FERC has considerable latitude to use the “directly affect-
147. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, 
at 1834.
148. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 29.
149. Id. at 30 (“[T]he Court did not conclude that state veto option is required 
by the FPA or necessary to support any federal regulation of state barriers to 
demand response as a practice affecting wholesale markets.”).
150. Id.; Alfred Kahn, The Supreme Court Saves Demand Response: Now What?, 
Scott Hempling, Attorney at Law (Feb. 2016), http://www.scotthemp-
linglaw.com/essays/the-supreme-court-saves-demand-response (concluding 
that “FERC . . . is free to remove the state veto.”).
151. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., Distributed Energy Resource Provider Ini-
tiative, No. ER16-1085-000 app. C at 2 (Mar. 4, 2016) [hereinafter CAISO 
Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative], https://www.caiso.com/Docu-
ments/Mar4_2016_TariffAmendment_DistributedEnergyResourceProvider_
ER16-1085.pdf. For a general discussion of DERs, see Distributed Energy Re-
sources, Electric Power Res. Inst., http://www.epri.com/Our-Work/Pages/
Distributed-Electricity-Resources.aspx (last visited May 12, 2016).
152. Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. (Jan. 28, 2016, 3:52 
PM), http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585
257DEA007DCFE2?OpenDocument.
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DER aggregation could take a wide variety of forms, 
including microgrids, small-scale facilities aggregated by new 
market entrants, or even resources controlled by incumbent 
utilities.159 The broad definition of DERs could dramatically 
expand the types and amounts of distributed resources in 
CAISO’s wholesale markets, create new classes of grid par-
ticipants, and stimulate market competition.160 A wide vari-
ety of firms—electric vehicle charging stations, demand 
response companies, home automation firms, and partner-
ships between battery storage and solar leasing companies—
have expressed interest in the California proposal.161
Because DERPs would sell DERs into CAISO’s whole-
sale markets, the California proposal required FERC’s 
approval. In spring 2016, it submitted a tariff amendment to 
FERC describing numerous program features, which FERC 
approved in June 2016.162 Now suppose that California has 
administered the program and gained experience with it. 
Then, further suppose that FERC believed the California 
program was successful and issued a rule that required other 
regions to adopt DER aggregation. The potential implica-
tions are staggering: in a multi-state region, DER aggrega-
tion would allow a consumer with excess solar power to sell it 
to consumers many miles away in a different state.
To the extent it would be implemented by third party 
aggregators, the DERP structure is functionally similar to 
the aggregation mechanism FERC v. EPSA approved for bid-
ding demand response into wholesale markets. And bids of 
electricity from distributed generation facilities would have 
impacts on wholesale market rates as direct as bidding in 
demand response. Adding new resources to a regional elec-
tricity mix would change wholesale prices, much as demand 
response lowered prices directly at times of peak demand.163 
Thus, adding more DERs to wholesale markets would 
directly affect wholesale rates and FERC would be acting 
well within its authority under the “directly affecting” stan-
dard if it required expanded DER aggregation.
As a predicate to this action, FERC would need to find 
that there had been undue discrimination against participa-
tion of these resources in wholesale markets.164 This require-
ment could be satisfied in a number of ways. These could 
include reference to the size restrictions on wholesale mar-
ket participation mentioned above. FERC could also take 
159. Id. at 5; cf. Jeff St. John, Texas Moving Into Real-World Proposal Stage for Distrib-
uted Energy-Grid Integration, Greentech Media (May 6, 2016), http://www.
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Texas-Moving-Into-Real-World-Proposal-
Stage-For-Distributed-Energy-Grid-Int (describing the proposal of the ER-
COT system operator in Texas to allow DER bidding into wholesale markets, 
with contemplation of an aggregation structure left to future proceedings). 
ERCOT is not subject to FERC’s authority, as it is located wholly within Texas 
and not connected to the rest of the nation’s grid. See ERCOT, Fed. Energy 
Reg. Comm’n (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-
act/rto/ercot.asp.
160. Order Accepting Proposed Tariff Revisions Subject to Condition, June 2, 2016, 
https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20160602164336-ER16-1085-000.pdf.
161. St. John, supra note 156.
162. CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative, supra note 151.
163. Id. at 24–25 (noting that DERs on the CAISO system will impact prices 
through reducing transmission congestion, among other benefits).
164. 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012) (requiring FERC to find the “rule, regulation, prac-
tice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unrea-
sonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential”); Rossi, supra note 6, at 57.
ing” authority to influence policy development, particularly 
if it perceives that state laws stand in the way of just and 
reasonable wholesale rates. The challenge is to balance its 
authority over the wholesale markets with the states’ spirit 
of innovation.
A. Promoting Renewables in Wholesale Markets: 
The Example of the California ISO “Distributed 
Energy Resources Provider” Proposal
As an example of how a jurisdictional dialogue might arise, 
suppose that FERC used the “directly affecting” standard to 
allow consumers to sell other resources into wholesale mar-
kets, including electricity generated from small-scale facili-
ties such as rooftop solar arrays. At present, wholesale market 
structures create barriers to doing so.153 For example, a roof-
top solar owner could not bid his excess electricity into any 
wholesale market, due to size limits on market participants 
and other restrictions.154
To remedy this situation, FERC need not invent a model. 
Instead, it could rely on a system that the California regional 
grid operator is already developing. The California ISO 
(“CAISO”) submitted a “Distributed Energy Resource Pro-
vider Initiative” proposal to FERC in March 2016.155 This 
proposal aims to reduce or eliminate barriers to DER inte-
gration in the regional grid. CAISO proposes the creation of 
a “distributed energy resource provider” (“DERP”), which 
would be an entire “new type of market resource similar to a 
generating facility.”156 A DERP would aggregate mixtures of 
DERs and sell them into the wholesale markets in amounts 
sufficient to meet CAISO’s minimum size requirement.157 
Either acting alone or through a contractor, a DERP would 
handle details such as scheduling and bidding, and metering 
and communication with DERs.158
153. CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative, supra note 151, at 1 
(noting that “[c]urrently, the CAISO tariff does not offer a clear platform or 
guidance for smaller distributed energy resources to participate effectively in 
CAISO markets”). Each RTO imposes its own minimum sizes for participa-
tion. For example, ISO-New England has a minimum generator size of 5 mega-
watts (“MW”). ISO New England, Manual for Market Rule 1, III.3.2.6, 
http://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2014/12/mr1_sec_1_12.pdf. 
For discussions of minimum bids for specific resources and markets, see James 
F. Ellison et al., Project Report: A Survey of Operating Reserve Mar-
kets in U.S. ISO/RTO-Managed Electric Energy Regions, Sandia Nat’l 
Lab. 18 (2012), http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2012_1000.
pdf (discussing requirement of continuous output for some specified duration 
of time to be a provider), and Chris Neme & Richard Cowart, Energy Ef-
ficiency Participation in Electricity Capacity Markets—The US Expe-
rience 5 (2014) (ISO-New England and PJM minimum bid sizes for energy 
efficiency project bids into capacity markets).
154. CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative, supra note 151, at 2 
(“For instance, in order for traditional supply resources to participate in the 
CAISO markets, they must meet the CAISO’s minimum size requirement of 
0.5 MW. This same requirement applies to distributed energy resources that 
wish to participate in the CAISO’s markets.”).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 3; Jeff St. John, California’s Plan to Turn Distributed Energy Resources Into
Grid Market Players, Greentech Media (June 12, 2015), http://www.green-
techmedia.com/articles/read/californias-plan-to-turn-distributed-energy- 
resources-into-grid-market-play.
157. CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative, supra note 151, at 2.
158. Id. at 8. The term for this function in CAISO is “scheduling coordinator.”
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note of the actions currently underway in many states to 
limit consumers’ ability to provide energy back to the grid 
through net metering or other means,165 or to choose innova-
tive financing models for rooftop solar power such as power 
purchase agreements.166
If FERC found that state laws limiting renewable energy 
development posed barriers to the participation of small-scale 
resources, and thus to the ability of the wholesale markets 
to provide just and reasonable rates, FERC could act under 
its “practices affecting rates” authority. It would be assert-
ing that these laws directly affected wholesale rates by limit-
ing market participation of DERs. And it could take action, 
even without incorporating a state veto into its rule. To avoid 
jurisdictional friction and potential political resistance, it 
could develop a nationwide program in consultation with the 
states. Perhaps that would be the wisest course of action, but 
after FERC v. EPSA, it is no longer strictly necessary.
B. Impacting End Users: Influencing Development of 
the Distribution System Operator Concept
FERC could also influence a dramatic transformation con-
templated by the New York Public Service Commission 
(“PSC”) in its REV proceeding, which proposes significant 
regulatory changes to make the state’s electric system cleaner, 
more resilient, and more affordable.167 One of REV’s central 
features is a comprehensive transformation of distribution 
level utilities into distribution system operators (“DSOs”). 
This concept has been widely promoted in recent years in 
Europe168 and the United States.169 Broadly speaking, the 
DSO concept involves utilities moving away from simply 
serving customers via their existing distribution infrastruc-
165. See generally NC Clean Energy Tech. Ctr., 50 States of Solar: Q1 2016 
Quarterly Report (2016), https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp-content/
uploads/50-SoS-Q1-2016_Final.pdf (identifying how states are limiting poli-
cies promoting solar energy). An example is Nevada’s law rolling back its net 
metering incentive. Julia Pyper, Does Nevada’s Controversial Net Metering Deci-
sion Set a Precedent for the Nation?, Greentech Media (Feb. 4, 2016), http://
www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/nevada-net-metering-decision. For 
discussions of impediments to renewable energy development generally, see 
Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By Whom?, 31 Utah Envtl. L. 
Rev. 339 (2011), and Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolu-
tion, 38 Ecology L.Q. 903 (2011).
166. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 30, 31 (“Under current FERC policies, 
some states similarly limit retail customers from providing excess energy from 
rooftop solar or energy storage to the grid, and some of these state barriers 
could similarly go too far . . . . FERC can act when ‘a state’s regulatory pro-
hibition on new entrants serves no purpose but benefitting incumbents while 
threatening competitive wholesale markets (as some state limits on third-party 
solar providers may).’”).
167. Reforming the Energy Vision, supra note 152.
168. Development of Methodologies and Tools for New and Evolving DSO Roles for 
Efficient DRES Integration in Distribution Networks, European Commission: 
Cmty. Res. & Dev. Info. Serv., http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/109548_
en.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2016) (containing research and reports of the 
“evolvDSO” consortium).
169. Lorenzo Kristov & Paul De Martini, 21st Century Electric Distribution System 
Operations (May, 2014), http://resnick.caltech.edu/docs/21st.pdf (discussing 
an “integrated distributed electricity system” that would perform this func-
tion, featuring DSOs) [hereinafter Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution 
System Operation]; Jeremy Lin & Katarina Knezović, 2016 13th Int’l Conf. 
on the European Energy Mkt. (EEM) (June 6–9, 2016); James Tong & Jon 
Wellinghoff, Rooftop Parity, Fort., Aug. 2014, https://www.fortnightly.com/
fortnightly/2014/08/rooftop-parity (proposing DSOs).
ture, to becoming system operators responsible for planning 
and operations of the distribution network. The New York 
REV would implement the DSO concept by turning utilities 
in the state into DSPPs.170
A central goal of most DSO discussions is to facilitate 
more widespread integration of DERs into the grid, partic-
ularly from new grid participants.171 The New York DSPP 
proposal, for example, is intended “to reform the utility busi-
ness model and practices so that planning for and integrat-
ing DERs from third party providers is a central focus.”172 
This recognizes that DERs are proliferating, but are primar-
ily owned by customers (as in rooftop solar) or third parties, 
so distribution utilities often do not take them into account 
in system planning efforts.173 A DSO would enhance inte-
gration of DERs through promoting revised business mod-
els and conducting markets for distribution-level electricity 
resources in which DERs would participate.174 A DSO could 
be an existing distribution utility or, as some propose, a new 
independent entity.175
1. Key Attributes of the DSO
Discussions of the concept envision that a DSO would con-
duct some or all of a wide variety of activities. One recent 
170. New York’s Public Service Commission split the REV proceeding into two 
tracks, with Track One focusing on DERs, distribution level markets, and the 
DSPP concept. Track 2 focuses on reforming utility ratemaking practices to 
reflect the DSPP model. The PSC’s Track One order of February 2015 elabo-
rated on the DSPP concept. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Regu-
latory Policy Framework and Implementation Plan, 14-M-0101, at 12 (Feb. 
26, 2015) [hereinafter N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order].
171. Herman K. Trabish, Jon Wellinghoff: Utilities Should Not Operate the Distribu-
tion Grid, Utility Dive, Aug. 15, 2014, http://www.utilitydive.com/news/
jon-wellinghoff-utilities-should-not-operate-the-distribution-grid/298286/; 
Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169, 
at 1; see also Kristov & De Martini, supra note 169, at 1 (discussing an “inte-
grated distributed electricity system” that would perform this function, featur-
ing DSOs).
172. Gavin Bade, REV in 2016: The Year That Could Transform Utility Business Mod-
els in New York, Utility Dive, Jan. 20, 2016, http://www.utilitydive.com/
news/rev-in-2016-the-year-that-could-transform-utility-business-models-in-
new-y/412410/.
173. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169, 
at 1 (“Up until now, there has been limited incorporation of distributed en-
ergy resources (DER), demand response (DR), energy storage (DESS) and 
energy efficiency (EE) into the distribution system planning efforts.”); Tong 
& Wellinghoff, supra note 169 (stating that for this reason DERs “are not in-
corporated into the utility’s resource planning mix”). Some utilities have begun 
programs to develop (or procure) and own DERs. See, e.g., Ian Clover, SDG&E 
Signs 20 MW Storage Contract, PV Mag., Apr. 1, 2016 (describing procure-
ment by San Diego Gas & Electric of storage).
174. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169, 
at 1; Tong & Wellinghoff, supra note 169. But see Kristov & De Martini, supra 
note 169, at 6 (noting that the DSO should not administer economic markets 
but should instead act as an interface with the wholesale markets).
175. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169, 
at 3 (calling for independence as a DSO core attribute); Tong & Wellinghoff, 
supra note 169 (“[W]e contend that the best way for a utility to embrace new 
innovations without disruption to the grid is to have the distribution utili-
ties transfer their operations to an independent distribution system operator 
(IDSO)”). The New York PSC considered a REV design with independent 
DSPPs, but concluded that, “because the DSP core functions would be highly 
integrated with utility planning and system operations, assigning them to an 
independent party would be redundant, inefficient and unnecessarily costly.” 
N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 45–46.
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report identifies numerous key attributes of a DSO.176 Among 
others, these include the following:
(a) Operational Flexibility
Regional grid operators dispatch power plants to utilities 
and load-serving entities that serve end users.177 In similar 
fashion, a DSO could serve as a retail-level dispatcher. In 
this capacity, much as an RTO does at the regional level, it 
would be “akin to an air traffic controller.”178 It would bal-
ance supply and demand at the distribution level with a wide 
variety of electricity resources, including traditional power 
plants and an expanded fleet of DERs. Once a significant 
amount of DERs are connected directly to the DSO, this 
would require a system with the flexibility to manage all of 
these resources and simultaneously balance real-time supply 
and demand. For example, the DSO would need physical 
tools intelligently designed to allow for two-way power flow 
among multiple nodes on the system.179
(b) Market Administration
The DSO would be responsible for creating and adminis-
tering markets, similar to the regional wholesale markets, 
which would trade DERs provided by third parties.180 The 
market structures would need to be designed to properly 
value DERs and provide incentives for them to participate 
and provide electricity in sufficient quantities. This would 
also be an added means of contributing to system flexibil-
ity, by diversifying the portfolio of resources used to meet 
demand.181 The DSO markets would be interconnected with 
wholesale markets, and, under certain structural designs, the 
DSO might be a wholesale market participant. For instance, 
if it was “netting out the aggregates of resources and loads at 
the distribution level,” it might purchase electricity from the 
wholesale market.182
176. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169, 
at 1–3; cf. Trabish, supra note 171 (identifying Jon Wellinghoff’s functions 
for an IDSO). In former FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff’s view, the IDSO 
would maintain system safety and reliability; provide open and transparent 
system access; implement market mechanisms; oversee optimal DER deploy-
ment and dispatch; guard consumers’ access to all transactive energy services; 
and allow regulated utilities, unregulated energy sellers, independent energy 
and service providers, and electricity customers equal opportunity to meet new 
electricity consumer needs.
177. Hammond & Spence, supra note 25, at 150.
178. Bade, supra note 172.
179. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169, 
at 2.
180. Id. The New York Track One order calls for distribution-level markets. N.Y. 
PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 33. New York aims to promote 
fairness in these markets by generally prohibiting utilities from owning distrib-
uted energy resources. Id. at 41 (“[T]he DSP market structure must monetize 
and exchange enhanced DER services in fair and open transactive markets[.]”); 
id. at 68 (“As a general rule, utility ownership of DER will not be allowed un-
less markets have had an opportunity to provide a service and have failed to do 
so in a cost-effective manner.”).
181. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 104 (“Utilities are respon-
sible for reliability, and the functions needed to enable distributed markets are 
integrally bound to the functions needed to ensure reliability.”).
182. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169, 
at 2.
(c) Operational and Planning Authority
The DSO would assume responsibility for operating the 
distribution system, matching supply and demand instan-
taneously, and maintaining this balance under a variety of 
contingencies, including variable output from intermittent 
DERs.183 The state’s design for the DSO might give respon-
sibility for operating the system and the markets to two dif-
ferent entities, but it is more likely (as is the case with RTOs) 
that a single entity would operate the distribution system and 
the resource markets. And, like the RTOs’ responsibility for 
planning for transmission adequacy, the DSO would plan for 
expansions of the distribution network and of the network of 
electricity resources available to serve end users.
(d) Open Non-Discriminatory Access
As at the regional level, the DSO design should incorporate 
“provisions or rules that require open, fair and non-discrimi-
natory access . . . by legitimate users of the system.”184 In this 
respect, the DSO should allow utilities, DER owners, cus-
tomers, independent energy and service providers and other 
third parties the equal opportunity to meet the needs of end 
users.185 This would require rules akin to FERC’s Order 888 
that required open non-discriminatory access to the trans-
mission grid.186
(e) Interface With the Regional Grid 
Operator
Finally, besides balancing supply and demand variations at 
the distribution level, the DSO would link with the regional 
grid operator. As noted more fully below, this intersection is 
complex, with many points of interaction.
2. Jurisdictional Intersections in DSPP 
Implementation in New York
Through the REV proceeding, New York is moving rapidly 
to adopt the DSPP architecture, its variant of the DSO con-
cept.187 In this proceeding, the state’s PSC is filling the role 
that FERC does with respect to the wholesale markets. It 
has taken on responsibility for design and implementation, 
acting as a “market overseer, enforcer of market rules, and 
creator of market structures[.]”188 Whatever form the final 
DSPP structure will take, it will involve many avenues for 
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Tong & Wellinghoff, supra note 169.
186. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385 
(1996); Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 18 C.F.R. pt. 
35 (2000). For a discussion of these developments, see Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory 
Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric Utility 
Deregulation, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 545, 550–51 (2005).
187. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 3.
188. Trabish, supra note 171 (quoting Jon Wellinghoff’s explanation of role changes 
of independent distribution system operators).
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state and federal jurisdiction to intersect.189 This section 
analyzes three different areas of FERC’s potential authority: 
jurisdiction over wholesale sales of electricity that would take 
place in the new system; “directly affecting” jurisdiction over 
DSPP market rules that the PSC will adopt by virtue of the 
impacts on wholesale rates; and “directly affecting” jurisdic-
tion over coordination activities between the wholesale and 
distribution level markets required as a result of interposing 
a distribution-level market structure between the wholesale 
markets and end users.
In its “Track One” order in 2015, the PSC made a number 
of key early decisions to guide design and implementation. 
For example, it stated that incumbent distribution utili-
ties (Consolidated Edison and National Grid, for example) 
would serve as DSPPs in New York.190 Other issues, such as 
the final design of distribution-level markets, are continu-
ing to receive regulatory attention in the REV proceeding. 
For example, the PSC contemplates that a DSPP would be 
“a seamless interface between aggregated customers and the 
NYISO.”191 Thus, the DSPP would fit between the regional 
grid operator and end users. This creates many linkages and 
requirements for coordination between the NYISO and the 
DSPPs. Markets administered by DSPPs would have numer-
ous overlaps with the wholesale markets.192 Any exchange of 
electricity between the New York ISO (the state’s grid opera-
tor) and a DSPP would be a FERC-jurisdictional wholesale 
transaction; it fits the FPA’s definition of a wholesale sale of 
electricity as a sale for resale to an end user.193
So too might any sale by a DER owner in a DSPP-
administered market. The analysis of this aspect of FERC’s 
potential jurisdiction is much more complex, and, as no such 
market yet exists, the exact nature of FERC’s authority will 
depend on the precise market structure that the PSC selects. 
However, there is some basis for drawing preliminary con-
clusions, as the process of developing New York’s distribu-
tion level markets is already underway. The Track One order 
describes a multi-stage process of evolution toward open 
DER markets,194 beginning with a near-term effort focused 
189. Christiansen, supra note 5, at 109 (noting that, because “REV contemplates, 
among other things, developing a state-level analog to the RTOs that operate 
federal electricity markets,” it has “the potential to create exactly the sort of 
“complex matter[s] that lie[ ] at the confluence of State and Federal jurisdic-
tion” that FERC addressed with respect to demand response in Order 745.”).
190. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 46–53.
191. Id. at 12.
192. Id. at 12.
193. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (defining the “sale of electric energy at wholesale” as “a sale 
of electric energy to any person for resale”); see also N.Y. PSC REV Track One 
Order, supra note 170, at 27–28 (comments of NYISO that DSPPs “should be 
subject to FERC regulation to the extent that [they] participate in wholesale 
markets”); Frank J. Guarini Ctr. on Envtl., Energy & Land Use Law, 
N.Y.U., Building New York’s Future Electricity Markets: Identifying 
Policy Prerequisites & Market Relationships 10 (2015), http://guarini-
center.org/building-new-yorks-future-electricity-markets/.
194. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 33 (“Products, rules, and 
entrants will develop in the market over time, and markets will value the at-
tributes and capabilities of all types of technologies. As DSP capabilities evolve, 
procurement of DER attributes will develop as well, from a near-term ap-
proach based on RFPs and load modifying tariffs, towards a potentially more 
sophisticated auction approach. . . .”). The structure of the market will be a 
function of the needs defined by the DSP and customers, the products avail-
able in the market and procurement mechanisms for those products, the iden-
tity and capabilities of market participants and their interactions among each 
on incorporating DERs through requests for proposals, and 
“potentially” leading to an auction structure.195 Building on 
that regulatory outline, an independent consultant jointly 
retained by the DPS and New York State Energy Research 
and Development Authority has recently produced a report 
to be used as an input to the REV proceeding.196 This report 
outlines the numerous parameters involved in the “design of 
a new, distribution level market for energy and related elec-
tric products from [DERs] and of a statewide digital Plat-
form to animate and facilitate the financial transactions in 
that market.”197 The DSPPs would co-own the platform, 
which would be a “business ecosystem” that would incorpo-
rate a forward market and a separate clearing market.198 The 
paper concludes that a “Platform Market” “will best fulfill 
the objectives of the Commission as articulated in its Frame-
work Order,”199 but the analysis in this section includes the 
important caveat that the platform structure may not be the 
ultimate design chosen for DSPP markets.200
This “platform” is designed to resemble the structure used 
by companies such as Uber and Airbnb that match buyers 
and sellers and take a percentage fee.201 Thus, it defines a “core 
interaction” that, like Uber’s pairings of drivers and prospec-
tive passengers, matches market participants with each other:
Parties can schedule delivery once parties complete the 
exchange of information and reach an agreement. The 
core interaction is completed, the parties have created and 
exchanged value, and there is a settlement.202
The platform would have a wide variety of participants.203 
These could include DER owners, DSPPs, energy service 
companies (“ESCOs,” competitive electricity suppliers in 
New York’s restructured electricity system204), third party 
aggregators and brokers trading DERs, system develop-
ers and installers, other energy companies offering services 
such as forecasting and analytics to consumers,205 and even 
individual consumers participating directly. The platform’s 
other and with the DSP, and policy guidance of the Commission. Customers 
will realize the greatest benefits from open, animated markets that provide clear 
signals—both long and short term—for benefits and costs of participants’ mar-
ket activity.
195. Id.
196. See generally Richard Tabors et al., White Paper on Developing Competitive Elec-
tricity Markets and Pricing Structures, Tabors Caramanis Rudkevich (Apr. 
2016), http://tcr-us.com/uploads/3/9/7/2/3972068/tcr_developing_competi-
tive_electricity_markets_paper__appendices_2016.pdf.
197. Id. at ES-1.
198. Id. at ES-4.
199. Id. at 57.
200. The report states this explicitly. Id. at 50 (“The Commission will ultimately 
decide whether to approve or reject the implementation of a platform and a 
platform market.”).
201. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 45 (“[P]latforms that facilitate a monetary 
transaction between buyers and sellers often try to monetize by charging a 
transaction cut, i.e., a percentage of the actual transaction value.”).
202. Id. at 40.
203. Id. at 39.
204. What You Should Know Before Choosing an Energy Supplier, N.Y. Dep’t of Pub. 
Serv., http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/DAA1CF3080DA35F68
5257FCB004EBB59?OpenDocument.
205. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 13 (using the example of “suppliers of small-
scale energy management systems, such as the NEST thermostat and the Tesla 
Storage Wall, to develop consumer-based Platform applications for those indi-
vidual DER technologies”).
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multi-faceted structure would facilitate exchanges between 
“producers,” who would be “typically the owners and aggre-
gators of the DER who can use their assets to deliver part 
or all of a core electric product,” and “consumers,” typically 
DSPPs and ESCOs.206 There would also be a wide variety of 
products exchanged, including “core products” like “energy 
and operating reserves” and other products and services.207
In this platform, there would be many different types of 
exchanges among buyers and sellers. Here, for example, is a 
matrix detailing the “range of transactions one could design 
a platform to support”208:
How much of this activity invokes FERC’s jurisdiction 
over wholesale sales of electricity? The state believes “none 
at all.” The Track One order spells out New York’s intent 
to bypass FERC’s sale jurisdiction by providing that “utili-
ties will not purchase power that would constitute a sale for 
resale.”209 However, suppose the PSC adopted a market struc-
ture (as its report contemplates) in which DSPPs purchased 
electricity from DERs and then sold it to their customers. In 
that case, as New York City and other commenters pointed 
this out to the PSC in comments in the REV proceeding, the 
sales in the market would be at wholesale.210 By comparison, 
the platform’s designers take the view that its structure does 
not involve purchases and sales because the platform merely 
facilitates exchanges between buyers and sellers. Accordingly, 
the report’s “understanding [is] that FERC may not interpret 
transactions in which the buyer acts as an agent of the seller, 
rather than holding title as a sale for resale.”211
Yet the broad FPA definition of “sale of electric energy 
at wholesale” contains no such limitation: it encompasses 
“a sale of electric energy to any person for resale.” Consider 
the first two categories in the table above: the sale of energy 
or reserves (the “core products” defined above) from a DER 
owner to a distribution utility or ESCO. If, after a transac-
tion like this took place, the distribution utility or ESCO 
206. Id. at 39.
207. Id. at 40.
208. Id. at 59 tbl. 5 (Range of Possible Platform Transactions).
209. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 43 (“To avoid overlapping 
jurisdiction over DSP activities, utilities will not purchase power that would 
constitute a sale for resale under the Federal Power Act, except for purchases 
that are otherwise required by law (e.g., the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies 
Act and PSL Section 66-c).”).
210. Id. (“New York City and others cautioned that products purchased by DSPs 
that are either repackaged for sale in ISO markets, or resold directly to utility 
customers, could trigger jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) over DSP activities.”).
211. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 8 n.16.
then sold the electricity it purchased to end users, this 
makes the original sales wholesale transactions. It would not 
matter that the platform simply acts as the “agent” for the 
seller and buyer. The first sales of DERs would be subject to 
FERC jurisdiction.
Even if for some reason it could not assert its sale jurisdic-
tion over transactions in the DSPP markets, FERC would 
also have jurisdiction over the linkages between 
the DSPPs and NYISO under its “directly 
affecting” authority. As one of many examples, 
consider the close coordination between the two 
levels of markets required under the REV pro-
posal for demand response participation. New 
York contemplates that if demand response is to 
participate more fully in wholesale markets via 
the DSPP, “[T]here will be a need for alignment 
of wholesale and retail market rules relating to 
demand response aggregation, program eligibil-
ity, product valuation, payment protocols, com-
munications technology and procedures, and measurement 
and verification methodologies.”212
Such coordination will be necessary to fully realize the val-
ues of distribution-level markets as well as to protect against 
risks of double payments. In some cases, this could require 
changes to wholesale market structures “to reflect [the] full 
value of services.”213 The consultant’s report describes an 
example. At present, DER participation in NYISO markets 
is limited. DERs do not take part in the energy market, and 
only demand response can bid into the NYISO capacity 
market.214 Demand response is further limited by restrictions 
that effectively preclude entities offering small-scale reduc-
tions from participation.215
The report identifies the potential for the platform mar-
ket to circumvent these restrictions by allowing multiple 
demand response sellers to “pool” their resources and act as 
a single, larger source of reductions sufficient to bid into the 
ICAP market.216 It states that the jurisdictional issues that 
this might raise are “outside the scope of this paper.”217 This 
is a tacit acknowledgement that this potential vehicle for 
increased demand response participation would raise FERC-
jurisdictional issues if NYISO needed to revise its demand 
response bid rules to accommodate the changes at the dis-
tribution level. FERC’s authority could also lead it to require 
212. N.Y. Dep’t of Pub. Serv., Developing the REV Market in New York: DPS 
Staff Straw Proposal on Track One Issues, 14-M-0101, at 34 (Aug. 22, 2014) 
(emphasis added); cf. CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative, 
supra note 151, at 2 (noting that the California DERP initiative was designed 
to “ensure that all aggregations are consistent with applicable rules and tariffs 
at both the retail and wholesale levels”).
213. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 30.
214. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 27; ICAP Data and Information, N.Y. Indep. Sys.
Operator, http://www.nyiso.com/public/markets_operations/market_data/icap/
index.jsp.
215. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 27 (“[T]he maximum reduction a DER can 
bid into the NYISO ICAP market is limited to the average coincident load 
of its host facility; the DER cannot submit a bid in excess of its host’s average 
coincident load.”).
216. Id.
217. Id.
Distribution Utility <==> DER Owner: Buy and sell Core Products to one another
ESCO <==> DER Owner: Buy and sell Core Products to one another (An inter-
mediary could also transact on behalf of DER owners)
Distribution Utility ==> Sells prequalified leads to ESCOs
Distribution Utility ==> Sells prequalified leads to DER system installers
DER system installers ==> Sell systems to DER owners
ESCOs ==> Sell full service supplier service to DER owners/households
Value added service providers ==> Sell analytics support to ESCOs
Value added service providers ==> Sell analytics support to Distribution Utilities
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adjustments to DSPP market rules to align them with any 
necessary changes to wholesale market operations.
In addition, FERC could exert influence over DSPP mar-
ket rules because increased DER penetration would directly 
impact wholesale market rates.218 Increased DER resources 
trading in state markets could reduce the amount of elec-
tricity utilities purchased on the wholesale markets. As the 
PSC’s consultant’s report states, “it is assumed that Distribu-
tion Utilities will begin, sooner or later, procuring electric 
products from DER to . . . cost-effectively displace purchases 
of energy, ancillary services, and capacity from the relevant 
NYISO wholesale markets.”219 This would lead to “direct” 
impacts on those wholesale markets, and under FERC v. 
EPSA the potential for FERC to assert jurisdiction over cer-
tain DSPP market rules.
How this will all play out in the end is uncertain, as 
the REV proceeding is not yet completed and many of its 
features have yet to be finalized.220 The REV involves the 
distribution system, jurisdiction over which the FPA tradi-
tionally reserves to the states. But this does not bar FERC’s 
involvement.221 One can anticipate a number of potential 
jurisdictional dialogues between FERC and New York.222 
The PSC consultant’s report specified that New York might 
use open access tariffs at the distribution level to establish 
certain terms and conditions of DSPP operations.223 If the 
state pursued this route, FERC could exercise oversight over 
these tariffs through engagement in dialogues with the PSC. 
Eventually, we might well see FERC adopt a generic “open 
access distribution tariff” (“OADT”) specifying terms and 
conditions for many different aspects of this interaction, 
similar to the open access tariffs that govern access to the 
nation’s transmission lines.224 If it approved of New York’s 
experiments, it could base the OADT on lessons learned 
from the REV proceeding.
III. State Jurisdiction After Hughes
Part II suggests that FERC v. EPSA could lead to jurisdic-
tional challenges, and constraints on states’ flexibility, if 
218. See Developing the REV Market in New York, supra note 212, at 33; cf. Varun 
Sivaram, The Supreme Court Just Clarified Rules for Modern Power Regulation 
. . . Or Did It?, Council on Foreign Rel., Energy, Sec’y & Climate (Jan. 
26, 2016), http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2016/01/26/the-supreme-court-just-clari-
fied-rules-for-modern-power-regulationor-did-it/ (“[T]hese distribution-level 
markets may very well meet the Court’s two part test in FERC of directly 
affecting wholesale rates and indirectly affecting retail rates, triggering federal 
jurisdiction over state initiatives.”).
219. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 8.
220. Christiansen, supra note 5, at 109 (“The REV proceeding is ongoing and it is 
impossible to say at this point what steps, if any, FERC might take to address 
the jurisdictional quandaries that it may present.”).
221. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 28 (“To the extent that customer en-
ergy resource programs address distribution or generation facilities, the plain 
language of section 201(b) of the FPA would appear to foreclose FERC from 
regulating them at all. Beyond this express prohibition on the regulation of 
certain facilities, FERC v. EPSA clarifies that FERC may still regulate wholesale 
rates and practices that directly affect them.”).
222. Id. (“What is important for this Essay, however, is the fact that REV and other 
state reforms are likely to create more of the jurisdictional challenges on display 
in EPSA.”).
223. See Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 26.
224. See generally Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff, supra note 19.
FERC uses the “directly affecting” authority to undertake 
a new initiative or coordinate with a state’s program. But 
in Hughes, the spotlight shone on the states, and their flex-
ibility to promote new power plants. What constrains the 
states in pursuing their goals in the electric grid, whether 
they are related to reliability, promoting clean energy, or 
other objectives?
The Hughes Court eschewed developing a precise stan-
dard, refraining from declaring ab initio which states’ efforts 
would be precluded. Under the narrowest interpretation of 
Hughes, one type of state initiative is barred: an initiative or 
subsidy with a direct effect on wholesale prices in a FERC-
approved wholesale capacity market.225 Maryland’s program 
operated by making a direct adjustment to the compensa-
tion paid to the generator in the PJM capacity market, so 
any other state incentive so closely tied to expected market 
revenues would be similarly suspect.226 The Court itself rec-
ognized this shortly after deciding Hughes in refusing to hear 
an appeal of a Third Circuit decision voiding a comparable 
New Jersey law.227
What other state policies might survive judicial scrutiny? 
This Part uses two examples to consider possible answers. One 
is a hypothetical state property tax incentive, as recognized 
by the Court in Hughes. The other is New York’s proposal 
to incorporate within its Clean Energy Standard program a 
“Zero Emissions Credit” (“ZEC”) mechanism.228 The ZEC 
program is designed to support nuclear power plants that are 
“struggling to stay in business because the market clearing 
prices do not cover long-run average costs.”229
These examples demonstrate that the laundry list of state 
initiatives the Court appears to endorse at the end of the 
Hughes majority opinion probably raises more questions than 
it answers. As Professor Emily Hammond recently observed, 
“The difficulty is that Hughes doesn’t really tell us which state 
initiatives will survive future Supremacy Clause challenges, 
and which will fail.”230
A. “Broad-Based” Policies: The Example of Tax 
Incentives
Under Hughes, states have considerable latitude to subsidize 
new generation. As in ONEOK, the Hughes Court divided 
state and local policies into two categories: those explicitly 
225. An LSE can still find other ways to meet the capacity obligation, either through 
self-supply or bilateral contracts. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299; Brief for the 
Respondents, at 40, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 
(2016) (No. 14-614) (explaining how the “fixed resource requirement” op-
tion in PJM allows LSEs these options); cf. Jeannine Anderson, FERC Upholds 
Exemption for Self-Supply in PJM Capacity Market, Pub. Pwr. Daily, Oct. 29, 
2015 (describing the FERC order exempting entities that self-supply from the 
PJM minimum offer price rule).
226. Emily Hammond, Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC: Energy Law’s Ju-
risdictional Boundaries—Take Three, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Docket (Oct. 2015), 
http://www.gwlr.org/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc-energy-laws-juris 
dictional-boundaries-take-three/.
227. Jeannie O’Sullivan, High Court Won’t Hear NJ Power Plant Subsidy Appeals, 
Law360, Apr. 25, 2016.
228. N.Y. Dep’t of Pub. Serv., Staff White Paper on Clean Energy Standard, 15-E-
0302, at 6 (Jan. 2016).
229. Hammond, supra note 226, at 3.
230. Id. at 4.
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designed to influence the wholesale markets, and “various 
other measures.
States might employ to encourage development of new or 
clean generation.”231 The Court appeared to sanction the lat-
ter category, as it provided that states “may regulate within 
the domain Congress assigned to them even when their laws 
incidentally affect areas within FERC’s domain.”232 Yet the 
Court’s mention of “tax incentives, land grants, [and] direct 
subsidies”233 (among others) as programs that would appear 
to pass muster leaves important questions unanswered, and 
much uncertainty for the future.
To begin with, the Court did not specifically approve 
this laundry list. It stated only that “we need not and do 
not address” whether these incentives would be allowed.234 
This leaves future courts to grapple with a number of vexing 
issues. Maryland’s law was invalid for two separate reasons. 
It “aimed directly” at the wholesale markets with an initiative 
that regulated only electricity generators that participated in 
the wholesale markets, not industries at large. And it based 
the subsidy level explicitly on wholesale market price signals. 
Which of these (or both?) is the “tether” the Court had in 
mind? That is, could a state provide any economic incentive 
targeted to a would-be power plant developer, as long as it 
only incidentally affected the wholesale markets and was not 
calculated based on market prices?
The answer is complex, as the example of tax incentives 
demonstrates. States use a wide variety of tax policies to 
promote business development,235 to varying effect.236 Vir-
ginia, for example, has dozens of categories and individual 
programs, including property tax exemptions, enterprise 
zone programs, job tax credits, and many others.237 Many 
target specific industries. For example, Virginia offers a tax 
exemption for certain manufacturers’ generating and cogen-
eration equipment used to improve energy efficiency in spe-
cific ways,238 and a “Green Job Creation Tax Credit” that 
231. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
232. Id. at 1290.
233. Id. at 1299.
234. Id.; see Jeannie O’Sullivan, High Court Leaves NJ Power Plant Hopes Dimmed 
But Not Out, Law360, Apr. 21, 2016 (quoting Day Pitney LLP partner David 
T. Doot).
235. Pew Ctr. on the States, Evidence Counts: Evaluating State Tax Incentives for Jobs 
and Growth (2012) (discussing numerous incentives, and evaluating the effec-
tiveness of states’ efforts to produce metrics for evaluating them).
236. There is extensive literature criticizing the use of state tax incentives as a busi-
ness development mechanism. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, 
Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 
1573, 1644 (2000) (“All the evidence points to a single conclusion: state tax 
incentives are a thoroughly unproven tool for promoting economic develop-
ment.”); Inst. on Taxation and Econ. Pol’y, Tax Incentives: Costly for States, 
Drag on the Nation (2013) (claiming that “tax incentives are of little benefit 
to the states and localities that offer them, and that they are actually a drag on 
national economic growth”).
237. Va. Econ. Dev. P’ship, Va. Guide to Bus. Incentives 7 (2014–2015), 
http://www.yesvirginia.org/Content/pdf/Library/2014-2015%20Guide%20
to%20Incentives.pdf.
238. Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3506(A)(9) (West 2016). Th is statutory provision es-
tablishes a separate category of personal property for generating equipment, 
which localities may exempt from taxation, that is used “for the purpose of 
changing the energy source of a manufacturing plant from oil or natural gas to 
coal, wood, wood bark, wood residue, or any other alternative energy source 
for use in manufacturing and any cogeneration equipment purchased to 
achieve more efficient use of any energy source.” Id.
promotes “employment in industries relating to the field of 
renewable, alternative energies, including the manufacture 
and operation of products used to generate electricity and 
other forms of energy from alternative sources.”239 This latter 
credit is set at “$500 for each annual salary that is $50,000 
or more,”240 so it is calculated without reference to the whole-
sale markets.
Hughes provided no specific guidance about whether this 
sort of targeted incentive is “tethered” to wholesale market 
participation. If “direct subsidies” are permissible, both of 
these incentives appear to be exactly what the Court had in 
mind. The mere fact that an incentive relates to the electric-
ity industry and might prompt a power plant to locate in the 
state does not appear to be a sufficient “tether” to the whole-
sale markets. Indeed, the Court’s support for the proposition 
that states have wide latitude to encourage new power plants 
suggests otherwise.
In this regard, the origins of the language “untethered to 
a generator’s wholesale market participation” in the respon-
dents’ merits brief241 may be revealing. The petitioners had 
argued that invalidating the Maryland program would pre-
clude the state from taking any action that would “affect the 
price signals” of the wholesale markets.242 The respondents 
claimed this generalization was overbroad,243 as the state 
could “make those price signals less relevant by subsidizing 
new generation through tax incentives or similar finan-
cial support untethered to a generator’s wholesale market 
participation.”244 What Maryland could not do was to “over-
ride the price signals” directly by adding its subsidy.245 Per-
haps, then, the Court believes state initiatives are permissible 
if they are calculated independently, without reference to the 
market prices. The impact on wholesale prices is incidental 
because it is only a byproduct of granting the incentive.
To illustrate the potential difficulties this might cause, 
consider the example of a property tax exemption. In Vir-
ginia, as in other states, real and personal property taxa-
tion is a local matter.246 Suppose a Virginia city adopted 
an ordinance exempting a power plant developer from all 
local property taxes, to entice the developer to locate there. 
Local real property taxes have broad-based impacts and do 
not “aim directly” at the wholesale electricity market. Thus, 
exemptions from them, like the two tax incentives described 
above, would appear to be permissible. This assumption 
would collapse if the expected revenue from the wholesale 
markets were factored into the calculation process. Suppose 
the city were explicit about this, for example, by setting the 
tax reduction at the amount necessary to enable the owner 
to recover its expected costs based on projected market rev-
enue. That would appear to be as problematic as the program 
invalidated in Hughes. However, it is by no means certain 
239. Id. § 58.1-439.12:05.
240. Id.
241. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 225, at 39–40.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. Va. Econ. Dev. P’ship, supra note 237, at 5.
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that a reviewing court would see it this way. The language 
in Hughes does not distinguish among “tax incentives” based 
on their method of calculation, so it might support allowing 
the incentive to stand. On the other hand, as noted above, 
Hughes does not give all incentives a free pass, so a reviewing 
court has latitude to closely scrutinize calculation methods.
If a court did strike a tax exemption because it was tied 
to market payments, this creates a perverse incentive for 
state and local taxing authorities to avoid rebuke by being 
less transparent about the reasons for granting exemptions. 
This introduces an additional element of concern about judi-
cial interpretation of Hughes, as it might require case-by-case 
examination of the motive for granting the exemption. The 
extent to which an incentive would be suspect could turn on 
a matter wholly unrelated to the electricity markets: whether 
the city was required to maintain an administrative record 
that properly explains its reasons for providing the incentive.
But even if the city does not state the connection to the 
markets explicitly, it is still there nonetheless. All incentives 
provided to the would-be developer are intended to make 
the plant more economically viable. One would expect the 
developer as a matter of course to take all projected costs 
and expected revenues into account in deciding whether to 
build, but that is true of all incentives. Thus, if a “direct 
subsidy” is possible, as the Court suggests, the developer’s 
expectations may not matter. The motive of only one party 
to the subsidy transaction—the state—would be pertinent; 
the developer’s internal calculation would be irrelevant. All 
of this will be hashed out in future cases, which is a recipe 
for considerable uncertainty.
B. Supporting Existing Power Plants in Wholesale 
Markets: The New York “Zero Emissions Credit” 
Proposal
Several states have recently contemplated subsidizing aging 
nuclear power plants that, their operators claim, have become 
uneconomical to run without the subsidies. States have put 
forth a number of reasons to justify these initiatives. Some 
states rely on nuclear power for as much as 20% or more 
of total electricity generation (and much of this is baseload 
generation), so, it is argued, losing the plants might threaten 
overall system reliability.247 Some states also justify incentives 
to nuclear plants on the basis that their generation of elec-
tricity produces no greenhouse gases, so these plants consti-
tute a “bridge” to a zero-carbon future.248 In this view, losing 
the zero-carbon capacity provided by nuclear power plants 
would make it even more difficult to reduce long-run green-
house gas emissions, as it would be impossible in the short 
run to replace this capacity with anything other than fossil 
fuel-powered plants.
Hughes does not directly address this type of initiative. 
The Court discussed incentives for constructing new power 
plants, rather than keeping existing plants operating. It is 
hard to imagine, however, that the Court’s logic should apply 
247. See discussion infra note 249 and accompanying text, and note 255.
248. See discussion infra notes 249–55 and accompanying text.
to new market entrants but not to existing participants. The 
core of a Hughes analysis is the extent to which a state’s incen-
tive for power plants is calculated with reference to market 
prices and, therefore, impinges on FERC’s authority to set 
those prices. If existing plants receive subsidies that distort 
market prices as much or more as the incentives for new 
power plants, those subsidies are also suspect under Hughes. 
Yet this raises a set of difficult analytical issues for the states 
seeking to subsidize existing plants. Because the plants in 
question are already operating, it is impossible to ignore their 
participation in wholesale markets. Indeed, in the case of the 
struggling nuclear power plants, it is precisely their alleged 
failure to cover their costs in the wholesale markets that has 
prompted the call for subsidies.
By “untethered to wholesale market participation,”249 the 
Court intended that lower courts focus on the closeness of 
the link between calculation of the incentive and current or 
expected market revenues. How close is close? Consider a 
range of ways in which the state might deal with the nuclear 
plants’ expected revenue shortfall. On one end of the spec-
trum, it might attempt to make the plants whole, by giv-
ing them the difference between expected market revenues 
and their costs. On the other end of the spectrum, the state 
could base an incentive on factors having no relationship to 
the market.
The saga of the New York ZEC proposal shows the dif-
ficulties that courts will have in applying Hughes to subsidy 
programs for existing plants. In January 2016, the New 
York Department of Public Service (“DPS”) released a staff 
report intended to design the state’s Clean Energy Stan-
dard (“CES”).250 As subsequently announced in an order in 
August 2016, the CES will require all LSEs in the state to 
provide 50% of their electricity from renewable sources by 
2030.251 The order requires LSEs to procure renewable energy 
certificates (“RECs”) to prompt renewable energy develop-
ment.252 In addition, as a “bridge” to the state’s renewable 
energy future, the order establishes a ZEC system for the 
electricity produced by the state’s nuclear power plants.253 
This is intended to prevent the premature retirement of three 
nuclear power plants in upstate New York that make sig-
nificant contributions to baseload power and grid reliability 
without creating greenhouse gas emissions.254 New York’s 
Governor, Andrew Cuomo, announced in 2015 that to pre-
vent the premature retirement of these plants, there would be 
249. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
250. Staff White Paper on Clean Energy Standard, supra note 228, at 1.
251. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, Nos. 15-
E-0302 & 16-E-0270, at 2 (Aug. 2016).
252. Id. at 14.
253. Id. at 19–20.
254. Id.; Hammond & Spence, supra note 25, at 209 (discussing a study by the 
New York ISO concluding that closing the Ginna plant, one of the three in-
cluded in the ZEC program, would seriously hamper reliability in New York). 
In 2014, nuclear power made up 31.3% of all electricity generated in the state. 
State Electricity Profiles: New York Electricity Profile, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. 
tbl. 5, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/newyork/ (providing Electric power 
industry generation by primary energy source, 1990 through 2014). The three 
plants selected for the ZEC mechanism made up just over half of this total, 
supplying 16% of the state electricity total. Staff White Paper on Clean Energy 
Standard, supra note 228, at 29.
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a financial mechanism to support them.255 The result is the 
ZEC system.
As originally envisioned by the PSC staff, ZECs would pro-
vide three qualifying nuclear plants in upstate New York256 
with support payments, reflecting their costs of operation. As 
with RECs, all LSEs would be required to “procure ZECs 
from qualifying plants.”257 However, unlike RECs, whose 
value would be determined through trading activity, the 
DPS would set the price of ZECs, basing it on the amount 
necessary to ensure that the plants stayed in operation.258
Due to the limited number of nuclear power plant own-
ers that would sell ZECs, and to protect ratepayers from the 
exercise of market power, the DPS would set the maximum 
price paid per ZEC in annual ratemaking proceedings.259 In 
the January proposal, that price would have been based upon 
the difference between the “anticipated operating costs of the 
units and forecasted wholesale prices” in the New York ISO 
wholesale markets.260 The staff report indicated this formula 
would set an appropriate and fair value for the environmental 
benefits (zero carbon emissions) provided by nuclear power 
plants.261 Unlike RECs, ZECs could not be used to demon-
strate compliance with the renewable energy mandate; they 
are a separate system. Moreover, ZECs may only come from 
plants that were online before 2015, so they are not intended 
to support new nuclear power plants—none of which are 
planned in New York in any event.262
Under the original proposal, the DPS would set the ZEC 
price by considering the utility’s full cost structure, taking 
into account the revenue it would receive from the markets, 
and its other costs. Indeed, given the traditional obligation 
of PUCs to consider a utility’s fixed and variable costs in 
setting rates, this calculation would be required. The ZEC 
cost would be passed along to New York ratepayers, as in the 
Maryland program invalidated in Hughes.263
This program, as proposed, could not have survived scru-
tiny under Hughes, as the ZEC price would have involved the 
exact sort of direct relationship to wholesale market prices 
that Hughes invalidated. The state’s policy would have been 
255. Governor Cuomo Directs Department of Public Service to Begin Process to En-
act Clean Energy Standard, N.Y. State (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.governor.
ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-directs-department-public-service-begin-pro-
cess-enact-clean-energy-standard (“[T]he Governor has directed the Depart-
ment of Public Service to develop a process to prevent the premature retire-
ment of safe, upstate nuclear power plants during this transition[.]”).
256. Staff White Paper on Clean Energy Standard, supra note 228, at 30; William 
Opalka, Plan Would Pay NY Nuclear Plants for Zero Emissions, RTO Insider, 
Jan. 22, 2016 (observing that the state’s fourth nuclear plant, the Indian Point 
power station, would close and would not be included in the ZEC program). 
257. Staff White Paper on Clean Energy Standard, supra note 228, at 31.
258. Id. at 32.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 32–33.
262. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, Location of Projected New Nuclear Power Reactors, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/new-reactor-map.html (last vis-
ited May 10, 2016).
263. Compare the recent proposal by the utility FirstEnergy to the Ohio PUC for 
approval of a surcharge on customer rates to keep aging coal plants in opera-
tion. While FirstEnergy stated that the surcharge would be based solely on pro-
jections of its power plants’ power production costs, those projections would 
include future estimates of successful bids in PJM capacity auctions. Gavin 
Bade & Robert Walton, FirstEnergy, Critics File for Rehearing in Ohio Power 
Plant Subsidy Case, Utility Dive, May 3, 2016.
“tethered” to the generator’s participation in the wholesale 
market under any reading of Hughes. The ZEC program 
would have been designed to influence only the electricity 
industry, and it would have taken the wholesale rate as an 
input to its decision making process. Indeed, basing the ZEC 
value on the difference between market revenue and utility 
costs would have been the program’s explicit purpose and the 
reason why it would be invalid.264
Perhaps recognizing this problem, the final PSC order 
employed a different mechanism for calculating the ZEC: 
basing it on a “social cost of carbon” intended to reflect the 
actual value of greenhouse gas emissions reductions.265 There 
are, of course, numerous and widely varying estimates of 
this figure.266 Federal agencies use a carbon price developed 
by the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Car-
bon (“USIWG”) to incorporate the social costs associated 
with carbon dioxide emissions into cost-benefit analyses of 
major regulatory actions.267 The order relies on this figure, 
subtracting from it an amount reflecting expected revenues 
that the nuclear power plants would receive in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) program.268 This 
acknowledges that to a certain extent the plants are already 
compensated for their zero-carbon generation, albeit not in 
an amount sufficient to ensure their long-run survival.
The PSC order establishes six two-year “tranches” of cred-
its for the nuclear plants. The formula for calculating the 
subsidy in the first two years is different from the formula 
that applies to the next ten years. For the first two years 
264. Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries—Take Three, supra note 
226 (“The reasoning of Hughes suggests that restructured states operating in 
organized wholesale markets may not build additional compensation into 
schemes that are expressly linked to a need for some amount of income over 
the wholesale clearing price.”). The express link between costs and revenues to 
determine support payments also calls into question the FirstEnergy proposal 
described above, to the extent the analysis relies on future estimates of revenues 
from capacity auctions. Bade & Walton, supra note 263. Similarly, the pro-
posed Illinois “Low Carbon Fuel Standard” bill that would require LSEs in that 
state to purchase “low carbon energy credits” from sources including nuclear 
power, modeled after the New York program, would have been in jeopardy 
after Hughes. The issue was skirted in the near term due to the state legislature’s 
failure to adopt the proposed bill. H.B. 3293, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Ill. 2016); Robert Walton, As Nuclear Plants Shutter, State Efforts to Save Them 
Are Coming Too Late, Utility Dive, June 6, 2016.
265. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, supra note 251, at 50–51.
266. Ctr. for Climate and Energy Solutions, Options and Considerations 
for a Federal Carbon Tax 6 (2013), http://www.c2es.org/publications/
options-considerations-federal-carbon-tax (“There are many estimates of the 
social cost of carbon and they vary widely”); John Wihbey, Understanding the 
Social Cost of Carbon—and Connecting It to Our Lives, Yale Climate Con-
nections (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2015/02/
understanding-the-social-cost-of-carbon-and-connecting-it-to-our-lives/ (dis-
cussing different approaches). For some of the many discussions of the merits 
of a carbon tax and design considerations, see Shi-Ling Hsu, The Case for a 
Carbon Tax (2011), Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-
and-Trade and Complementary Policies, 49 Harv. J. on Legis. 207 (2012), and 
Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 499 (2009).
267. U.S. Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost Carbon, Technical Sup-
port Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, 2 (2013) 
[hereinafter U.S. Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost Carbon, Tech-
nical Support Document] (discussing the cost calculations performed by the 
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon).
268. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, supra note 251, at 51; see Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Auction Prices, https://www.rggi.org/market/co2_
auctions/results (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
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(Tranche 1), the subsidy is the USIWG cost of carbon less 
the expected RGGI revenues, converted to a cost per MWh 
and resulting in a subsidy of $17.48/MWh.269 Thereafter, the 
subsidy is calculated similarly, but subtracts the amount by 
which a combination of specified NYISO wholesale energy 
and capacity prices exceeds $39 per MWh.270 The order 
provides explicitly that this formula is not based on actual 
market revenues, stating that, “These components measure 
only the change in forecasts over time; they do not establish 
energy or capacity prices.”271
The formula for Tranche 1 should pass muster under 
Hughes as untethered to wholesale market prices.272 Neither 
the USIWG carbon price nor RGGI prices are calculated 
with reference to wholesale electricity markets.273 This dis-
tinction may seem arbitrary if it results in the power plant 
owner recovering the same amount as it would have received 
under the original ZEC proposal. However, an incentive pro-
gram structured in this fashion should be permissible after 
Hughes, unless it was structured to account for market con-
ditions (if, for example, the PSC indicated how basing the 
Tranche 1 amount on the social cost of carbon would make 
up a specific level of expected market revenue shortfall).
New York’s subsidy for Tranches 2 through 5 presents a 
more difficult situation. If the test for whether a subsidy sur-
vives scrutiny after Hughes involves whether it directly takes 
wholesale prices as an input, the state’s formula may be infirm. 
The PSC order implicitly acknowledges this by attempting 
to distinguish its formula from one subtracting prevailing 
energy and capacity prices directly from costs. Whether this 
distinction is enough to sway a reviewing court is completely 
unknown. Some have argued that Hughes should be read 
extremely narrowly in this context.274 In the narrow view, 
the only type of incentive that is impermissible is one that 
directly changes market prices, and New York’s formula does 
not do this.275 They base this conclusion on the final sen-
269. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, supra note 251, at 51. Both the 
USIWG carbon price and RGGI allowance figures are quoted in dollars per 
short ton of emissions. To convert this to dollars per MWh, the PSC employed 
a “conversion factor” of 0.53846, reflecting the average emissions per kWh of 
electricity across the New York power plant fleet. 
270. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, supra note 251, at 6 appx. E (ex-
plaining this formula).
271. Id. at 138.
272. However, if this resulted in the plant receiving considerably more than its con-
ventionally calculated revenue requirement, it would leave the DPS open to 
a charge that the result was not just and reasonable under New York’s Public 
Service Law. N.Y. Pub. Svc. L. § 65 (Consol. 2016).
273. The federal SCC is based on a “comprehensive estimate of climate change dam-
ages and includes, among other things, changes in net agricultural productiv-
ity, human health, property damages from increased flood risk and changes in 
energy system costs, such as reduced costs for heating and increased costs for 
air conditioning.” U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Fact Sheet: Social Cost 
Carbon 1 (2015); U.S. Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost Carbon, 
Technical Support Document, supra note 267, at 2; see also Shi-Ling Hsu, 
A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes, 83 U. Colo. L. Rev. 179 (2011) 
(proposing a carbon tax calculated with respect to global temperature chang-
es); Frances C. Moore & Delavane B. Diaz, Temperature Impacts on Economic 
Growth Warrant Stringent Mitigation Policy, 5 Nature Climate Change 127, 
127 (2015) (basing the costs of greenhouse gas mitigation on total factor pro-
ductivity growth and capital depreciation). None of this, of course, links car-
bon mitigation costs to wholesale electricity market prices.
274. Keith Goldberg, NY Nuke Plant Subsidies Will Likely Face Legal Battle, Law360, 
Aug. 2, 2016 (quoting attorneys Daniel Riesel, Joe Fagan, and Harvey Reiter).
275. Id.
tence in the Hughes majority opinion: “So long as a State 
does not condition payment of funds on capacity clearing the 
auction, the State’s program would not suffer from the fatal 
defect that renders Maryland’s program unacceptable.”276 Yet 
a reviewing court might find that the relationship between 
New York’s subsidy program and the wholesale markets is 
too interwoven to survive scrutiny. While the PSC did not 
base the amount of the subsidy on expected market revenue, 
it did use a specific level of revenue as a subsidy floor. Pay-
ment of subsidies under these circumstances could be consid-
ered as tethered to market participation by virtue of using the 
floor as an input to the subsidy calculation process. Litigation 
to clear up this situation is virtually guaranteed.277
Given all these uncertainties, and more, it is unlikely 
that the Court had any of this in mind when it drew up the 
laundry list of measures like tax incentives that it thought 
would be permissible. “Aiming at the wholesale market,” 
“untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation,” 
and “condition on participation in the wholesale market” are 
words likely to bedevil federal courts for years to come. In 
the absence of yet another Supreme Court decision clarify-
ing its new positions on electricity federalism,278 more guid-
ance is not likely to be forthcoming. This language offers 
little predictability. The state can always request that FERC 
approve its program as leading to just and reasonable whole-
sale rates, but that approval may not be likely if the market 
impacts are substantial. States will have to either vet their 
statutory and regulatory initiatives with FERC, or run the 
risk of expensive litigation.
IV. Conclusion
Prior to ONEOK, FERC v. EPSA and Hughes, several years 
had elapsed since the Court had issued any decision involv-
ing the electric grid, much less three in one year. These three 
cases taken together are likely to be the Supreme Court’s last 
word on electricity law and policy for years to come, and sig-
nal a new era of allocating jurisdictional responsibility over 
the electric grid.279
Taken as a whole, several conclusions may be drawn from 
these cases. First, FERC has sweeping authority to trans-
form the electric grid under the “directly affecting” test,280 
subject to certain limitations. When new technologies for 
generating, storing, and transmitting electricity reach their 
full potential, FERC can step in and redesign the wholesale 
markets to accommodate them. It should cooperate with the 
276. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
277. See generally Goldberg, supra note 274.
278. Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries—Take Three, supra note 
226 (noting that after Hughes, “[w]e are likely now in the position of awaiting 
‘Take Four.’”).
279. See Bravender, supra note 121 (quoting the author, stating, “I think we will 
look back on these series of decisions decades from now as foundational and 
landmark decisions that allocate responsibility for governing the grid in a very 
different way than the bright line split of the Federal Power Act would seem 
to imply.”).
280. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 31 (“FERC cannot shy away from 
exercising its statutory responsibility to set basic ground rules for interstate 
energy markets—including the elimination of significant state barriers, 
where warranted.”).
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states,281 but has substantial latitude to affect their initia-
tives. At the same time, the states can take actions under 
broad-based statutes such as antitrust and tax laws. They can 
pursue their own energy goals as long as their subsidies do 
not directly target FERC-jurisdictional wholesale rates. After 
Hughes, many questions about the scope of this authority are 
put off to the future.
Second, these decisions mark the end of dual federalism 
in electricity law because it can no longer be said that federal 
and state actions are disconnected. As the Court has now 
noted, the bright line between federal and state jurisdiction 
is unworkable in the modern, interconnected electric grid. 
Instead, the Court has recognized in all three cases, the two 
levels of government are now interconnected for the foresee-
able future. FERC v. EPSA’s “directly affecting” standard 
and Hughes’ invalidation of the Maryland contract for dif-
ferences give FERC authority while preserving latitude for 
states to act. Thus, both may act simultaneously even if it 
impacts the other: FERC may act even if it impacts retail 
rates, and the states can act if they do not “disregard” whole-
sale rates. This new electricity federalism is not ideologically 
driven, but instead is a pragmatic approach to the modern 
realities.282 Nor is it an unwelcome development in light of 
the modern movement from dual federalism to concurrent 
jurisdictional approaches generally.283
Finally, the jurisdictional division of responsibility 
between FERC and the states is now a matter of experimen-
tation rather than a system governed by hard and fast rules. 
FERC v. EPSA is no pure jurisdictional grab at the states’ 
expense, as Justice Kagan’s “notable solicitude” for states’ 
efforts is an indication that states will be active participants 
281. Id. (deeming it “particularly important for FERC to consider using a coopera-
tive federalism approach” because many technologies for the grid’s future are 
only now under development).
282. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. 1288, was unanimous, and the two earlier decisions crossed 
ideological lines: Justices Alito and Kennedy joined Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion in ONEOK, supra note 3, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ken-
nedy joined Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in FERC v. EPSA, supra note 1.
283. Young, supra note 6, at 145 (noting that, “just as concurrent regulatory ju-
risdiction can coexist with federal supremacy, it is also not inconsistent with 
the idea that certain powers may be exclusively vested in one government or 
the other.”).
in shaping the grid’s future.284 But it may result in FERC 
actions that bring new participants into the wholesale mar-
kets, which would inevitably prompt jurisdictional clashes 
with the states.285
The challenge of striking the jurisdictional balance accu-
rately after these decisions shows that while the Court has 
given FERC the green light to act boldly, it was demonstra-
bly uncomfortable with sorting out all of the potential con-
sequences for the states. Hughes and ONEOK set overarching 
principles and allow for case-by-case determination of state 
interference with the federal scheme, rather than aspiring 
to doctrinal precision. In states whose utilities do not par-
ticipate in organized wholesale markets, of course, the prin-
ciples of traditional electricity regulation will continue to 
apply as before.
One conclusion implicit in all three of these decisions is 
that there is no need for a new or revamped FPA. While 
modern challenges seemed to have stressed this venerable 
statute near its conceptual breaking point, it has demon-
strated its remarkable flexibility to handle today’s challenges. 
Wisely, the Court appears to recognize that the FPA governs 
a complex, highly technical and rapidly evolving industry, 
that the Court lacks the expertise of federal and state regula-
tors, and that it might make a serious misstep if it did more 
to precisely define how the FPA should govern the federal-
state relationship going forward. But there has been no 
suggestion that statutory overhaul is necessary. On the con-
trary, the Court has relied explicitly on the statutory text to 
address matters never foreseen in 1935. For that reason, the 
FPA remains a solid foundation on which to build a robust, 
modern electric grid.
284. Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 21 (“Some may read Justice Kagan’s opin-
ion as an expansion of federal jurisdiction at the expense of state power, but we 
see it otherwise.”).
285. See generally Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 
supra note 5.
